

बाह्यर्थसिद्धिकारिकानाम ॥

श्री-स्वर्ग-गृह-दर्शन-स-स-तेष-प्र-वर्ति-कै-ग-भेद-प्रश-प ।

BAHYARTHA SIDDHI KARIKA

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Introductory

Genesis of the Treatise.

We have in the collection of Tibetan Tripitaka Tangyur five works attributed to Bhadanta Subhagupta in the following order : (1) *Sarvajnasiddhikarika*, (2) *Bahyarthasiddhi Karika* (3) *Scrutipariksa*, (4) *Anyapoha-vicara*, (5) *Iswarabhangakarika*. Of these the second, viz. *Bahyarthasiddhi*, Tib. *phyi.rol.gyi.don.grub*, *pa* is the most valuable and interesting. It consists of about 190 verses (*anustup*) counted for convenience into 188 verses. The purpose of the treatise, as its title implies, to refute the *Yogacara* idealistic philosophy and to prove the reality of the external universe from the standpoint of the Sarvastivadi-Vaibhasikas. Vasubandhu, for example, in his *Vimsatika* elaborated a good deal to demonstrate the impossibility of atomic theory of the Vaisesikas. Dignaga again in his *Alambanapariksa* confirmed Vasubandhu's opinion on the basis of his logical and epistemological foundations. Next the upholder of the Idealistic School of Buddhism was Dharmakirti who embarked on the task of establishing his philosophy of absolute Idealism by enumerating several logical arguments. Of those, the argument of *Sahopalambha-niyama*, concomittance of co-cognition is most powerful and proverbial with all the posterior writers of Indian philosophy. Now the uphill task of reviewing all the arguments set up by the above masters of Idealism rests with Bhadanta Subhagupta, a renowned master of the Vaibhasika school of Buddhism. Subhagupta, in the present treatise takes up to examine in detail all the points raised in favour of Idealism and succeeds in presenting his case, the case of the Vaibhasika masters (on the subject) so brilliantly and vehemently that still later some masters, like Santarakshita and Kamalasila could not remain without making another attempt to vindicate their own positions in opposition to Subhagupta's premise. In course of their examination into Externalism (*Bahirarthapariksa*) they quote Subhagupta's passages verbatim and refute his arguments one by one. Thus we have about 11 verses of Subhagupta cited all of which are traced in the present treatise (see verses Nos. 29, 35, 44, 66, 68, 71, 81, 87, 89, 95, 101). Kamalasila cites also some prose passages (v. Panjika, p. 574, 20) from Subhagupta giving rise to a surmise that Subhagupta might have also written some commentary on the treatise which is not translated into Tibetan.

This appraisal of the treatise may give a fair idea of when the author Subhagupta must have flourished. His time must be fixed between Dharmakirti (650 A. D.) and Santarakṣita-Kamalasila (700-50 A. D.). He must be also anterior to Akalanka, a Jain author (c. 700 A. D.) since the latter quotes the former in his *Nyayaviniscaya* the ver : *saha-sabdasca loke'smin, etc.* (*Bahyarthi*, ver. 71). We may therefore place him during 650-700 A. D. (Cf. T. *Sangraha*, Intro. XXXIV).

REVIEW OF TOPICS

Now let us make a brief survey of the whole contents of the treatise. One of the most powerful arguments in favour of Idealism is the example of dream experiences Subhagupta refutes it by pointing out differences between the wake experiences which are never contradicted and the dreams which are always contradicted. To the contention of the Yogacara that all our knowledge and experience are illusive, the author replies that some knowledge may err on account of some defect in our cognitive apparatus but to say that it errs even in the absence of such defects creates an absolute darkness in the universe (v. ver. 31 with note).

Dignaga holds that because each atom is not separately cognized there could be no atoms at all; the author points out in reply that the reason, i.e. non-cognition of atoms in isolation (*ekaika-aparicchede*) is not conclusive; mind and mental phenomena, though not separately experienced, exist (v. ver. 33, 34). He maintains further that atoms cannot appear in life in isolation; when they appear in association with others they lose their atomic characteristics; how, then, could each of the atoms be reflected in our consciousness?—he asks (ver. 43). On an external material object which is constituted of several atoms, we have an idea of 'one' but this idea of oneness is illusive and is produced as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms (ver. 35) and that is our mental construction (36). The atoms being coagulated into an integrated form discharge a uniform action and therefore they cannot be designated as non-substances (40).

Vasubandhu's criticism of atomic theory on the basis of spacial distinction (*digbhagabhedā*) which contradicts the theory itself is not at all reasonable; for we hold that there is no space apart from the atoms themselves. When we talk of space we mean the atoms themselves spread in certain fashion (45-46). The conception of one whole (*avayavīn*) is also illogical. If you

consider it possible as a result of the atoms being closely knit together in a large number, you may better also conceive one time-unit on the moments that are preceeding and succeeding in an uninterrupted succession (50). Atoms have a peculiar relationship amongst themselves due to which no intruder could enter in the midst of atoms; by virtue of the same relationship the covering of atoms by other atoms has been upheld and therefore there is not any reason to presume the atoms have parts (52). The atoms, though mutually unrelated and partless become collocated and accomplish the gross things like the globe of earth, etc. on account of some excellence of mutual efficiency (*anugrahavisesa*) (56-57). Certain number of atoms alone enter into combination by virtue of that substance-efficiency (*dravya-sakti*) but there are many others which could not do so on account of their meagre power (58-59). The atoms could be counted by some spiritually advanced saints alone and therefore conceive them to be existing even though we do not cognize them. (65).

Next the author taking up to examine the maxim of *Sahopalambhaniyama* remarks that the knowledge is only cognizer and that too is only in the presence of some visible object and therefore they are cognized simultaneously but this fact does not testify their identity (67). Then the said *hetu*, reason has been pointed out to be defective in several respects; sometimes it is indefinite, sometimes contradictory and sometimes unproved and so on. The term *saha* 'together' always implies a companion and if there is really *Saha-vedana*, 'together-cognition', the reason will obviously prove the contrary to what is cherished. The object felt by some other person in his own mind cannot be denied by us because it is far removed from our cognizance. The meaning of *Sahavedana*, according to the author is that when the knowledge-factors, sense-organ, etc. being present previously produce the sensuous consciousness in the next moment, then it may be termed *Saha-vedana* (82). Speaking truly, the knowledge is not at all cognized, but it is said to be cognized figuritively since it cognizes its object by the law of nature. But the object is indeed cognized since it gives rise to its knowledge (85). To the question: How a knowledge cognizes, the author replies: the knowledge functions as if it measures the external thing (90-92).

We have to take note here that the author does not plead, as the Sautrantika does, that the knowledge cognizes through the process of asuming the image of its object. Therefore he says: The image which you presume as existent in the object-

knowledge truly exists in the external things alone and not in the knowledge (96). This image-theory is not favoured by the advocates of *Cittamatrata*, Idea-alone in the ultimate plane of existence. The point becomes evident from the following statement of the author: "You plead that the knowledge which, in fact, is imageless experiences its unreal images. I, likewise, advocate that the imageless knowledge experiences real things (102). He makes his position further clear by saying that the consciousness which is imageless and formless comprehends (*paricchid*) through the agency of material sense-organs like the eye, etc. (105). The author turns the image theory as an unfavourable proposition to the opponent thus:

When a consciousness—form is accepted to be shaped by the form of an object, how does it mean that the consciousness comprehends it? (90). When we maintain that consciousness flashes up in the presence of its object, your query as to how it does so is an irrelevant question (91). The consciousness is not creator of its object; nevertheless people on its simple awareness of its content, attribute to it a creative function (92). The author's realistic outlook is quite obvious in his solemn declaration that the process of cognizing the external things is the same with the saints as with the worldlings, with this much difference that the former is characterized by his detached and comprehensive vision (*Sarvakara dhiya*) whereas the latter by covetous observation of things (94). Immediately after this assertion however, the author concedes a special privilege to Buddha whose power of knowledge cannot be interrogated whether it comprehends simultaneously or in succession and whether it assumes the image of the object or does not (95). This opinion may not be shared by the Sautrantika who is not in favour of allowing any exception to the general law of knowledge operating always in a gradual process. Note Vasubandhu's clear-cut exposition of this law: *Santanena samarthatvat yatha' gnih sarva-bhug math/Tatha sarvavid estavyo na sakrt sarya-vedanat*/Kosakarika, IX, 1.

The *Kramavedana* is also the opinion of Harivarman.—Satyā-siddhi, Chaps 75, 76, etc. Cp. Pancavastuka-Vibhāsa, p. 27 (Visva-Bharati Annals, X).

It is interesting to note that the well known lamp example cited in favour of *Sva-samvedana* theory has been turned by the author to his advantage thus: As you hold that the lamp illuminates itself as well as others, just so I hold that a knowledge illuminates the selves of two or more *alambanas* of the same kind

(106). Therefore according to Subhagupta, the visual consciousness, e. g. can comprehend simultaneously several visible things falling within its range; thus our cognition of several colours in a carpet (*citrastarana*) is quite reasonable.

The Yogacara maintains that knowledge cognizes its own aspect as its objects and hence what is cognizable (*grahya*) is only a part of knowledge. On this point the author remarks that the Tathagata's sayings like everything is impermanent, etc. do not at all disclose that things meant there are the aspects of consciousness itself (104). Some doctors maintain that a knowledge of previous moment serves as the object-cause of the next following knowledge; this view is not acceptable to the author; for, no knowledge necessarily follows immediately after another knowledge (118-119). Some other doctors consider that some force (*sakti*) productive of knowledge is regarded as the object-cause; this too is not appropriate for the reason that not any *Sakti* is experienced in our sensuous consciousness (120-21). It has been stated finally on the authority of the world and scripture that the external things alone are reasonable to be upheld as the object-cause of our cognitive experiences (123-24). The author further states that the external things are established not merely on account of their simple efficiency in their presence but also on account of such efficiency being experienced even in the case of their mistaken knowledge (*viparyaya-jnana*) (129-31); that is to say, when we mistake a snake for rope and tread upon it we are at once startled by its reaction.

According to this author the knowledge of the discerner of other's thought is not untrue but it is quite natural. The others mind could be comprehended just as any other external things are comprehended. The grasping of an object by our mind is not an act of running towards its objects, but simply an act of measuring (*pariccheda*). The Buddha is omniscient because he comprehends the entire universe through the agency of his cognizing knowledge (147-48). In the absence of external things none can become omniscient (150). The author has not accepted what Dignaga states in regard to an indescribable form of the object being cognized in the first moment (149-49). Nor does he subscribe his opinion to Dignaga's theory of construction-free mind in the first moment. (115). Dignaga's theory of *Svasamvedana*, introspection is also not favoured by this author, who constantly maintains that knowledge is always a cognizing agent and never becomes cognized. The theory of intro-cognition is generally believed to have been propounded by the Sautrantikas on the strength of memory of the knowledge in a later

period (v. Madh. Avatara VI, ad. 72 Tib. p. 167, my Skt. text p. 60) and to have been followed by Dignaga and his followers (v. Pramanas. I, II). Subhagupta though not in favour of *Svasamvedana* explains the memory as merely a mind directed towards the past thing; therefore it is not a cognition (*graha*) since it does not flash up from its cause (145-48). The Vaibhasika is not only the school that refuses to certify *Svasamvedana*, the Madhyamika too does the same. The memory however is possible, says the Madhyamika, since the consciousness as a cognizer is related to the past thing (Bodhicar. panjika. p. 401, 16).

The author further points out some more flaws in the system of the Yogacaras. When we assume some entity existing externally then alone the contemplation upon it as no-soul becomes possible; but no such contemplation is possible in the case of Idealism (159). The Buddhahood which is according to you, completely an inactive state can be secured without making any efforts (161). The person who conceives the charity, etc. as mere thoughts is not able to release any person from poverty even by repeated practice of the charity-mind (168). These are some of the objections that are levelled against Idealism; and therefore the scriptural passages which speak of *cittamatrata* must not be interpreted quite literally. Their interpretations, according to Subhagupta are as follows: The Buddha has declared (*cittamatrata*) with reference to the imaginary aspects of the external things but that does not at all imply that the external things are absolutely non-existent (179). Likewise the doctrine of no-soul has been preached with reference to the imaginary aspect of things in order to remove all the passions in the mind of worldlings addicted to sexual pleasures (180). It has also been stated in some place that the external things do not exist in such forms as the ordinary worldlings entertain in their mind (181).

In fine the author sums up his constructive conclusion of his system as follows: There is something inferred (*kalpita*), something fancied (*vikalpita*) and *Dharmata*. The inferred (*kalpita*) is nothing but *bhava*, some basic entity, atoms; the fancied is diversity of the former (like the earth, etc.) and *Dharmata* finally is the self-substance (*Svalaksana*). Of these three the author probably views the first and the last as real and the second, i.e. *Vikalpita* as unreal. This explanation may quite accord with the opinions of the *Vaibhasikas*.

Text and Translation

The Tibetan text that is presented in the following pages is based on *Bstan hgyur* collection of the Tibetan Tripitaka preserved in our Visva-Bharati Library (Narthang edition) and then it was collated with the same in Peking Edn. recently printed in Japan and preserved in the Library of the Sahitya Akademy, New Delhi. Different readings are all noted in the foot-notes to the Tibetan text.

The Tibetan text has been preceded by its English translations with copious annotative foot-notes supplying all the available references and informations on the topics discussed in the text. A tentative rendering into Sanskrit of each verse of the treatise has also been provided in the foot-notes with a view to making the trend of discussion more understandable to the readers who may be familiar with Indian philosophical texts and their styles. Indian (Sastric) texts are generally not very easy to interpret without having recourse to some commentary. The present text being not provided with any commentary, the task of interpreting it properly has become much tough. I have, however, endeavoured to understand the text with the sole aid of my limited experiences and studies in Buddhism and its philosophy. My Tibetan-Sanskrit glossary contains only those words that are found in the original Sanskrit verses arranged in a separate page 9. My thanks are due to Geshe Byam pa thsul khrim, a Tibetan refugee Lama working in the Visvabharati for supplying me with a transcript of the Tibetan text included in this publication.

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The original Sanskrit verses of the Bahyarthta Siddhi
identified so far

धीमालत्वेन संसाध्ये यत् ज्ञानत्वादि साधनम् ।
विजातीयाविरुद्धत्वात् सर्वं शेषवदुच्यते ॥ २९ ॥

तुल्यापरक्षणोत्पादात् यथा नित्यत्वविभ्रमः ।
अविच्छिन्नसजातीयग्रहे स्यात् नीलविभ्रमः ॥ ३५ ॥

प्रत्येकपरमाणूनां स्वातस्त्वेणास्त्यसम्भवः ।
अतोऽपि परमाणूनामेकैकाप्रतिभासनम् ॥ ४४ ॥

नान्योऽस्ति ग्राहको ज्ञानात् चाक्षुर्विषयं विना ।
अतश्च सहसंवित्तिनभिदात् नीलतद्वियोः ॥ ६६ ॥

एककालविवक्षातः सम्बुद्धज्ञानवेतसा ।
चित्तचैत्तैश्च हेतुर्हि सर्वथैकान्तिको नच ॥ ६८ ॥

सहशब्दश्च लाकेऽस्मिन् नैवायेन विना क्वचित् ।
विरुद्धोऽयं ततो हेतुर्यद्यस्ति सहवेदनम् ॥ ७१ ॥

पूर्विकं तु सामग्रा प्रज्ञानं विषयक्षणम् ।
सालोकरूपवत् कुर्यात् येन स्यात् सहवेदनम् ॥ ८१ ॥

साकारज्ञानपक्षे च तन्निर्भासिस्य वेद्यता ।
तस्याभेदे च संसाध्ये सिद्धसाधनता भवेत् ॥ ८७ ॥

कथं तदग्राहकं तच्चेत् तत्परिच्छेदलक्षणम् ।
विज्ञानं तेन नाशद्वा कथं तत् किं वदिति ॥ ८९ ॥

साकारं वा निराकारं तुल्यकालमतुल्यजम् ।
इति बौद्धोपि विज्ञाने किं तु चिन्ता प्रवर्तते ॥ ९५ ॥

यथा हि भवतां ज्ञानं निराकारश्च तत्त्वतः ।
वेत्ति चाभूतमाकारं भूतमर्थं तथैव नः ॥ १०१ ॥

BAHYARTHA—SIDDHI

Establishment of Objective Reality

1. One¹ who fulfilled in every aspect all duties beneficial to his own person (*Svartha*) as well as duties beneficial to other living ²beings ; to Him I salute in order to achieve the success (*artha-siddhi*) and demonstrate the truth of the objective universe.

2. (The Idealist says :) The³ external thing that serves as the object of consciousness in the person of perfect eyesight does not exist (as real) ; (Reason) ; because it is a (mere) idea and because the idea manifests itself as external thing, (example;) just like a dream-thought and the double-moon idea.⁴

3. Thus⁵ the advocate of Idealism (theory of mind alone) proves the non-existence of the external thing. Now, we at the outset prove that the external things on the basis of experience never contradicted⁶ in our daily life (*avisaṃvadadrsti*).

4. The⁷ alternative proposition that either the object-cause (*alambana*) is unreal because its knowledge is contradicted in our daily experience, or it is so, because the material and other things are not fit to exist, is, both unsatisfactory.

5. One⁸ experiences in dream one's own body chopped up into pieces; but this act of chopping is utterly unreal. If externalism is untrue in dream, does it apply to the waking stage ?

6. If⁹ you mean (lit. desire) that the beheading¹⁰ of a waking person and his bodily exuberance resemble a dream experience, why are you then so much care-laden about your gain and loss.

7. If¹¹ you say that every human activity is guided by illusion; but there is no perversion¹² in naming things. A knowledge which is non-illusory is never contradicted. What is contradicted is always illusory.

8. A knowledge¹³ of a material thing which differs from neither space¹⁴ nor time is never contradicted; hence it is non-illusory (*abhrantu*). This alone is the characteristic of non-illusory knowledge and nothing else.

9—10a. The¹⁵ person who comprehends the extremely long things as well as the extremely small things is distinguished as the Saint¹⁶ (Yogin). (In case of absolute denial of external things)

the Buddhist Saint would not be omniscient and not get double sided release¹⁷ (*ubhayatobhaga-vimukti*) and thus Buddhahood would also be contradicted.

10. *b-d.* (The Idealist continues):¹⁸ Even our truly apprehension (*yathavatpratiti*) that every thing exists absolutely resembles the experience of things in dream.

Now, why does it not become possibly contradicted (as a dreamy thing does) ?

11. If¹⁹ (things exist) on account of deep-rooted impressions (*vasana*), why are not the dreamy things also explained (In the like manner ?) Hence the cognizable things like village and garden, etc. are true and become visible.

12. The²⁰ mere thought bereft of sense-data and its impression (*vasana*) are all momentary ; (thus) the gain of their resultant fruits is interrupted. (Therefore) the sense-data (be admitted) as the stable causes of ²¹fruition.

13. For²² him who opines that the knowledge of one²³ taste does not at all arise from any sense-datum, the nature of that knowledge (we ask) is whether permanent or impermanent.

14. If²⁴ it is similar to a dream (lit. sleep) will it not produce its resultant fruit ? The cause of fruition (*vipaka*) being present, the destruction of fruition is improper.

15. Just²⁵ as something seen by a sleepy person in his dream does not appear the same in the next moment, and hence becomes impermanent ; likewise the destruction of the matured fruition is possible.

16. In²⁶ whose opinion the sense-data are non-existent and hence there is no occasion (lit. cause) for preaching, (for him) the fruition will repeat endless even after its destruction.²⁷

17. Why²⁸ do you view that a man does a religious action by virtue of his deep-rooted impressions (*vasana*) of non-contradiction ? If you say : because the material and other external things are unfit to be real, to this point we shall reply (later on).

18. If²⁹ non-contradiction in the waking state persists on account of the maturation of *asraya* (= *Alayavijnana*) why is it

not (like this) that as long as there is eye-disease (*timira*) as basis (*asraya*), so long there is non-contradiction³⁰ ?

19. Suppose³¹ the Yogacarin acts (*pravrtti*) on the notion of mind alone (*Cittamatrata*) and on the presumption of the all *alambana*^{31a} as false; when in the interval the notion of *Cittamatrata* is absent, even then the act is not contradicted (*avismavada*) and therefore the act is not caused by that notion.

20. The³² Sakti matured (*paripaka*) for *aropa*, assumption is produced from some other external thing and not from the self³³ just like the sesame seed produced is from its flower.

21. And³⁴ the seed from the water, etc. What is produced from a cause, that product is similar to its cause. No *vasana*³⁵ is to be assumed on account of the genesis of the fruit as one infers the fire at the sight of the smoke.

22. Things³⁶ are made fragrant on account of an act produced from some other thing; for example, the sesame seed becomes fragrant on its contact with the *Jati*³⁷ flowers.

23. Here³⁸ the seven kinds of consciousness are produced from their *upadana* consciousness and their seeds being previously imputed there and dormant become matured into such consciousness under favourable conditions.

24. Therefore³⁹ the theory of *vasana* needs not to be assumed (as the Idealist does) on the presumption that no entity is produced from another entity, declare the advocates of Sakti.⁴⁰

25. Nevertheless,⁴¹ if you say: the knowledge of *adhigama* (*rtogs.pa*), definite perceptual experiences arises of its own accord (*svatantratah*) and this my opinion may be compared with the fact of the seed⁴² which being sowed matures of itself.

26. This⁴³ opinion too is not acceptable. Again your plea that its dependence on its *upadana* consciousness is common to us both, is not valid as it incurs a logical fallacy of mutual reliance (*anyonyasraya*).⁴⁴

27.-28a. This⁴⁵ defect is absent in the system⁴⁶ which holds that Saktis that are imputed (*aropita*) by the knowledge produced by the sensuous objects get nourished and matured into seven kinds of sensuous consciousness by dint of some *Visesa*, excellence of favourable conditions, like the object, time, individual, etc.

28 b-d. But⁴⁷ there is a system⁴⁸ of thought which maintains that there is not any cause (of our objective experiences) other than the knowledge itself named *upadana* (= *Alaya-vijnana*) and this is quite irrelevant.

29. When⁴⁹ the proposition of *Cittamatrata* that is to be established the proof or argument (*sadhana*) is the knowledge itself (*Jnanatva*); this proof is non-contradictory to any heterogeneous case (*vijatiya*) and therefore the said proposition is declared to be *sesavat*⁵⁰ (i.e. *sesavad-anumana*).

30. A⁵¹ close scrutiny (*legs-dpyad*) joyfulness (*dgah mgur*) engagement (*pravrtti*) gain of the good and rejection of the bad; all these activities of the wake-up person never exist in dream.

31. Certain⁵² sensuous knowledge errors on account of some impediment (-this is possible). But to say that even in the absence of an impediment there is an error⁵³ creates an absolute darkness in the universe.

ATOMIC THEORY PROVED.

32. Others⁵⁴ say: Everything is nothing but consciousness; the notion that there is an external object (corresponding to the sensuous consciousness) is a mental illusion. The knowable (object) is what is produced internally from one's own mind but it is not a visible object (*rupa*) (existing externally outside of the mind⁵⁵).

33a-c. The⁵⁶ proposition that there exists no object is to be maintained (*samsadhyha*); because each atom is not separately cognized, atoms do not appear in knowledge⁵⁷ :—So says Dinnaga.

33d-34. (*Hetu-Reason*)⁵⁸ would become doubtful (*sandigh-dha*) when it is applied to Citta and Caitta, mind and mental-phenomena.

Just like momentary things are not cognized in their discrete moments, the atoms would be undetermined even by the understanding of Tathagata.

35. (The author continues :)⁵⁹ Just as the illusive idea of permanence appears to us as a result of continuous rise of homogeneous moments (= momentary atoms) in succession, just so the illusive idea of a patch of blue appears as a result of cognition of the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms.

36. When⁶⁰ we cognize in our mind the uninterrupted and homogeneous atoms, our constructive thought constructs their oneness⁶¹.

37. Therefore⁶² the theory (of the Idealists) that the atoms in their self-substance are not reflected in our⁶³ consciousness is totally unfounded.

38. What⁶⁴ a form of object is reflected in a knowledge, from that object-form its knowledge does not arise, and this object-form is not a substance (*dravya*) and resembles the double⁶⁵ moon : (says-Dinnaga). This conclusion is not a sound one because its *hetu, probans* is not at all proved as valid one.

39. The⁶⁶ atoms which being integrated, discharge a uniform action are termed *Sancita*,⁶⁷ integrated;—to the upholder of this opinion how do the atoms become non-substances (*adravya*) ?

40. They⁶⁸ (atoms) are spoken of as one but they possess no oneness. For, the import of all words being investigated is not at all reflected in the sensuous consciousness.⁶⁹

41. The⁷⁰ philosopher (i.e. Idealist) who states that one part of the mind reflects as the object-image in consciousness must have witnessed a piece of carpet with pictures in variegated colours⁷¹ (*Citrapataka*).

42. In⁷² certain place, when an image of certain object (*rupa*) is cognized, that image being related to higher and lower areas (*asraya*) appears divided (to form) a picture in varied forms⁷³.

43. An⁷⁴ atom which may manifest its own single knowledge cannot appear in life as separated from other atoms. When it appears associated with other atoms it loses its atomic form, how then could each of the atoms appear to our knowledge ?⁷⁵

44. Atoms⁷⁶ cannot each individually and independently appear in life and this is also the reason why each of the atoms never flashes out in our consciousness.

45. Vasubandhu's⁷⁷ criticism of the atoms on the basis of their spacial distinctions is baseless⁷⁸. For, the term, space (*diksabda*) is employed on the atom itself that is associated with some other atoms.

46. Hence⁷⁹ by the spacial distinctions the atoms themselves are meant when surrounded by several⁸⁰ other atoms but never the atoms are constituted of parts.

47. When⁸¹ one atom is situated at the bottom and the other on the other side they so situated never become double on account of these two sides.

48. When⁸² the atoms are situated in the midst of several atoms, they are imagined as many and likewise by the process of reverse of the one they are assumed as many.

49. A⁸³ (gross) form distinct from its own, for example, is witnessed on the atoms as a result of their mutual combinations (Lit. one depending upon another) but this gross form does not at all exist there just like a distinction of the front and the back made on the atoms.⁸⁴

50. If,⁸⁵ as a result of atoms being uninterruptedly knit together in a large number, one substantial whole (*avayavin*) is conceived, why will not the moments that are preceeding and succeeding in an uninterrupted succession be conceived so⁸⁶ (i.e. one indivisible time-unit) ?

51. Since⁸⁷ knowledge continues to exist for two moments⁸⁸ its uninterrupted existence (*nairantarya*) is possible, yet the form of one unit (*avayavi-rupa*) is not permissible on the knowledge ; the same principle is likewise applicable to the atoms⁸⁹ also.

52. By⁹⁰ virtue of a peculiar relationship (*pratyasatti*) amongst atoms the entry of a moving body into the aggregated company of atoms is hindered and by the same device the covering of atoms by other atoms is accepted, but not due to their constituent parts.⁹¹

53. The⁹² shadow is produced when there is a covering of the sun, but that shadow is not proper to be accepted as existing in between the two atoms of the sun.⁹³

54. Just⁹⁴ as the power of producing the shadow and covering is the phenomenon of several united things so also is the case with several atoms but no single atoms can produce such phenomenon.

55. Therefore⁹⁵ what is stated by Vasubandhu that a lump (*pinda*) is impossible to exist₉₆ since the distinction between the

atoms and the lump is not available, may perhaps be accidental (*kadacitka*) if there is any propriety in maintaining the atoms as stagnant (i.e. never transformed into any other form under any circumstances).

56. The⁹⁷ atoms, (though) they are mutually un-related⁹⁸ and devoid of parts, nevertheless become integrated and accomplish (the gross things like) the globe of earth, and others.

57. By⁹⁹ virtue of some excellence of mutual efficiency (*anugraha*) the atoms become transformed and likewise they never become scattered (i.e.) of the diamond (*vajra*) and other such things.

58. Certain¹⁰⁰ atoms become integrated by virtue of their peculiar substance-efficiency (*dravya-sakti*) just like the evil spirit (*pisaca*) the serpent and others are subdued by force of *mantra-sakti*.

59. But¹⁰¹ there are many other atoms having very little power and strength¹⁰² (to appear in life).

The¹⁰³ person endowed with a sharp intellect and living in a mountain (*acala*) and such other places could count the atoms of the hell (and the heaven), etc. with their numbers and other distinctions.

60-61a. Therefore¹⁰⁴ it is not proper to declare that the atoms do not at all exist. If you say that the affirmation of the atoms has been made due to some illusion (*bhranti*) then your understanding¹⁰⁵ that everything is nothing but the activity of the sixth knowledge (= intellect) would be much more illusory resembling an illusory knowledge of the number 'eight' on the aggregate of eight atoms.

61b-62. If¹⁰⁶ you plead that the conception of the atoms is a notion mistaken for some other basic¹⁰⁷ thing for these two considerations, viz. (1) that things like the hell, etc. are known as nothing but condemned living beings¹⁰⁸ and (2) that the atoms are never cognized directly (in our perceptual experiences), then why do you not state likewise (as illusory) of the number form and other characteristics of Pradhana¹⁰⁹ and Purusa, etc.?

63. You¹¹⁰ may say: The same remark holds good with regard to such things also because Pradhana is regarded in the terms of some excellence of characters (*gunatisaya*) (like *sattva*,

rajas and *tamas*). I now reply: though the conception of Pradhana, etc. is illusory, this does not warrant us to forsake our previous contention (about the atoms).

64. Therefore¹¹¹ the atoms are existing really. They are not cognized by any body other the sages living in¹¹² a mountain and other places. The atoms are conceived because the saints cognize them.

Saha-vedana, co-cognition possible

65. When¹¹³ two persons (look at an object) in a place, it is an invariable rule that they have simultaneous cognition of it; it is also the law of nature that knowledge with its content (lit. knowable) are invariably cognized at once.¹¹⁴

66. There¹¹⁵ is no cognizer other than knowledge and the visual knowledge is no more cognizer in the absence of visible objects, and therefore their cognition is simultaneous but this co-cognition is not due to the identity between the object, i.e. patch of blue and its cognizer.

67. If¹¹⁶ the consciousness is not in the mood of cognizer or the knowledge is bereft of an object, then only that could reasonably be stated so and not otherwise.¹¹⁷

68. If¹¹⁸ the term *saha* is employed to signify one and the same time the reason (i.e. *Sahopalambha*) becomes indefinite in all respects (*anaikantika*) when it is applied to the Buddha's knowledge which co-exists with its content, other's mind (*jneyacetasa*) and the mind that co-exists with mental properties (*citta-caittaisca*).

69. If¹¹⁹ the mental properties are not illusory as they are sanctioned in the scriptures; how do you then say that the knowledge of the ghost,¹²⁰ hell and others is an illusion?

70. If,¹²¹ even in the absence of any relevancy some distinction (between the idea of the hell, etc. and the mental elements) saves your difficulty (lit. serves your purpose), that distinction is absolutely unproved, yet you cherish it proved; thus your rejoinder is based again on illusion.

71. The¹²² term 'saha' co-existence is never employed in the world in any place where a companion is not available. The reason (*hetu*—*Sahopalambha*) will then be a contradictory one if there is really a co-cognition.

72. If¹²³ the term *Saha* 'co-existence' is taken to mean one and the same thing (*ekarthi*) then *hetu* would be unproved (*asiddha*) for other party;¹²⁴ for example when some common things are present, how does only one person look at them?

73. If¹²⁵ every mind of other living beings is cognized by the knowledge of the omniscient being, then, where is it proved that only one person experiences it (*ekena upalambha*)?

74. The¹²⁶ object-cause felt by a person internally in his own mind cannot be denied by any other person, as there can be no evidence for doing so.

The reason (*hetu*) further becomes doubtful and unproved on the ground that it is, in its very nature, far removed, i.e. beyond the reach of other's cognizance (*svabhava-viprakrsta = nan-bshin. bkhala. ba*).

75. If¹²⁷ the reason (*hetu*) considered to be proved as a result of the denial of external things and (thus leading to the conclusion) that one aspect of the consciousness itself is cognizable, then the reason would be known to only one party¹²⁸ who plead for the doctrine of mind alone (*cittamatrata*).

76. If¹²⁹ you consider it a proven fact that the knowledge and the knowable flash out as identical (*aprthakbhasa*), then the reason would simply prove what is already proved. Even the advocate of knowledge having the capacity to assume the image of the object (*sakarajnanavadin*) would not dispute here in this matter¹³⁰ (thus leading to *siddhasadhanata*).

77. If you¹³¹ conceive the object-cause as identical (with its knowledge) how is it that the object-cause is cognized distinctly from the knowledge?

78. Suppose,¹³² for example, a man, while experiencing an external object (*ariha*), has joyful feelings in this wise : this shell is black, if these feelings are regarded as coming from the knowledge itself this will be improbable in the absence of experience of the object in that fashion.¹³³

79. If¹³⁴ certain imaginary form (*kalpita-rupa* i.e. black) of knowledge is experienced, then its real form is not experienced ; therefore the reason (*Sahopalambha*) is not proper to set up.

80. For¹³⁵ this reason two forms¹³⁶ of the knowledge are to be experienced in the same manner as the double moon is

looked at by some. Thus the author's (= Dharmakirti) statement of "one" (*abheda*) becomes unfounded.

81. The¹³⁷ causal factors (*saṃgrī*)¹³⁸ of the preceding moment give rise to a full cognition of the object in the next moment just in the same fashion as a visible object (*rupa*) in association with the light produces its cognition, due to which fact a successive¹³⁹ cognition (*sahavedāna*) would become justifiable.

82. When¹⁴⁰ the knowledge and its sense-organ happen to be just one after another (*purvapara*) the term co-cognition (*sahavedāna*) is used by way of similarity (with a simultaneous phenomenon) but never there is literally co-cognition (*sahavedānam na arthatāh*).

83. Since¹⁴¹ the knowledge-content is felt internally, it is no entity other than the self of knowledge; to the advocate of the system of maintaining the knowledge possessing a knowable aspect in itself the reason becomes undetermined.¹⁴²

84. Since¹⁴³ it is the law of nature that a knowledge cognizes its content (*jnanam vetti*), the knowledge is said to be cognized; since the content produces the knowledge as reflector of itself it is considered as cognized.¹⁴⁴

85. Though¹⁴⁵ the term 'cognized' (*saṃvedya*) is applied equally to the knowledge and its content, its import is quite different. For, the wild cow, etc, e.g. are not regarded of the (same) forms, *visanin*, horned figure on account of^{145A} the usage of the term, cow, etc.

86. There¹⁴⁶ are certain dharmas which are contemplated in the minds of other streams of elements (*santanantara*) are perceived by the knowledge of the Omniscient (*Sarvajna*). Then the reason (when it is applied to those dharmas) becomes uncertain,^{146A} *anaikantika* (because they are perceived simultaneously, yet distinct from the knowledge of the Omniscient). If he does not comprehend them, how can he be an Omniscient?^{146B}

87. In¹⁴⁷ the system of the image-invested knowledge (of the Sautrantika) the knowledge is perceived only when it reflects the image of an object. If you desire to prove the identity of the knowledge with its reflected image the reason would then, simply achieve what is already achieved (*siddha-sadhanatā*).

88. The¹⁴⁸ external thing (*artha*) produces in the knowledge an image similar to itself and as a result of this fact it is

considered as perceived figuratively.¹⁴⁹ The external thing is not at all perceived and hence its identity with knowledge will not be proved.

89. If¹⁵⁰ you ask: How is the knowledge (or consciousness) considered to be the cognizer of its object? (we answer:) the consciousness is characterized as (if it is) measuring the object (*tat pariccheda laksana*) and therefore no query should be made as to: how is it and what like it is?

90. (In¹⁵¹ the system of the Sautrantika-Yogacaras) an image is aroused and imprinted in consciousness by the external things; how could it be said that the consciousness is a measurer of the external thing (*artha-paricchedaka*)?

91. Consciousness¹⁵² (by law of nature) is considered to be entirely a comprehending agent and hence it is irrelevant to ask how the consciousness would comprehend its own object.¹⁵³

92. The¹⁵⁴ consciousness is not creator of any thing and in fact, it is functionless. Its characteristic, however, is mere awareness of the presence of an object¹⁵⁵ (*vittimatra*), but the act of creation, is attributed to it by imposition (*samaropa*).

93. Just¹⁵⁶ as a saint of detached vision enters into the self of knowledge (*jnana-rupa*), etc. so also the person of a meagre vision enters into it.

94. No¹⁵⁷ distinction exists between the Saint and the worldling so far as their knowledge alone is concerned. But the great souls however, are distinguished by their knowledge of varied aspects¹⁵⁸ (*Sarvakaradhi*).

95. Do¹⁵⁹ we enquire into the knowledge of the Buddha whether it assumes the image of the object or does not, and again whether it comprehends the object simultaneously or successively.¹⁶⁰

Akara-vada disproved

96. What¹⁹¹ image according to you, presumably exists as pertaining to an object-knowledge, that image exists in fact only in the external thing like the visible element (*rupa*), etc. but it is assumed to exist in the knowledge.¹⁶²

97. It¹⁶³ is irrelevant to say that not any cognizable thing exists for the Saint who has given up all obscurations¹⁶⁴ (*avarana*); for, he is anchored in this cognizable (world); how can it be substituted and equalized to the mind alone (*tanmatra-sama*)?

98. Our,¹⁶⁵ intellect is sole demonstrating agent whether the external thing exists or does not exist. There really exist the external objects to which fact no contradiction is experienced,¹⁶⁶ for example in the case of eye-disease, etc. some figure is observed even when there is not any figure.

99. Likewise¹⁶⁶ one thinks that he experiences in the knowledge a patch of blue and accordingly imposes upon the knowledge the presence of the blue image but in fact no such image exists in it.

100. The¹⁶⁷ assumption that the image exists in the knowledge or does not exist is a type of consciousness in the nature of a productive imagination (*kalpanatma*). The consciousness, however, becomes differentiated due to *vishesa*, individual characteristic of the observed object.¹⁶⁸

101. You¹⁶⁹ plead that the knowledge which is in fact imageless¹⁷⁰ experiences its unreal image, I likewise, advocate that the imageless knowledge experiences the real external thing.

102. There¹⁷¹ is not a distinct self of the knowledge (in the form of a separate knowable aspect); for, to assume it would contradict the non-dual essence of the knowledge (*advaya-jnana*). No unreal image could be experienced by the knowledge; (if the image is experienced) it would turn to be non-illusory.

103. If¹⁷² (you argue that) the above arrangement has been made in accordance with the presumption under the influence of the deep rooted illusion, then the image of the knowledge ought to be viewed as illusory,¹⁷³ otherwise how could it be an assumed image ?

104. Hence¹⁷⁴ consciousness which is imageless in truth, would comprehend (*pariccid*) through the agency of the material eye, etc. all the fitting things whether existent or non-existent.¹⁷⁵

105. If¹⁷⁶ (you say that) just as the lamp¹⁷⁷ illumines the self as well as others, just so the consciousness (illumines) the selves of two *alambanas*¹⁷⁸ (of one kind); then, there would be no contradiction at all.

106. However¹⁷⁹ the various objects, visible, sound etc. are domains of various¹⁸⁰ sense-organs; hence they cannot be experienced by one sense-organ.

107a-b. (According to you) even when different causes are absent the knowledge is experienced as (in the presence of) *alambana*.¹⁸¹

107c-9a. A¹⁸² knowledge arises from an external object as similar to it and that knowledge in the immediately next moment bears an image similar to that external thing:—this contention is a simple illusion¹⁸³; for, the knowledge does not exist as permanent (to assume the image of the object). Further there is not any experience of the self of the knowledge similar to the object at the moment when the object becomes illuminated.

109b-10a. In¹⁸⁴ every mind the knowledge form¹⁸⁵ is uniform—if this view is favoured, it could not be stated particularly, it is similar to this object.

110b-d. When¹⁸⁶ this (knowledge) illuminates the cognizable thing no knowledge immediately after that would appear, because it becomes entirely assimilated with its content¹⁸⁷ (*visaya*).

111-12b. If,¹⁸⁸ while the knowledge lights up just a patch of blue, etc. the knowledge lighting up the patch of blue, etc. exists immediately after that, and then, if it exists having the patch of blue as its content, then at that time the knowledge is not similar to the object. True, it exists indeed, but never similar (to its content).

Grahya aspect criticised

112c-13. The¹⁸⁹ Tathagata's saying, for example, that all is impermanent and sorrowful does not exhibit as content the cognizable aspect of knowledge (*grahyabhaga*).

If you are inclined to plead that since the object-cause (*alambana*) is not fit to exist in the external, the cognizable aspect of the knowledge is accepted as the content, then the characteristic¹⁹⁰ of the content cannot appropriately be applied to it (≡ content).

114. How¹⁹¹ does the mind exist as separated from its act of construction?¹⁹² That idea is only a fancy of your mind (*cittasvabhava*). There does not exist the mind shedding light on its content, because the latter is not available (for you) other than the mind itself.

115a-b. If¹⁹³ there is nothing productive (of the knowledge), how is it at all desired¹⁹⁴ (as content) ?

Discussion on the actual object

115c-16b. The¹⁹⁵ simple atoms and the co-agulated atoms (in your system) are not the object-causes, because they lack one requisite (*anga*) each.¹⁹⁶ How is the denial of both (simple and co-agulated atoms) cherished ?

116c-17b. The¹⁹⁷ knowledge in the form of cognizer is devoid of two characteristics (of *alambana*, viz. objectivity and causality). Then if there is no object-cause (*alambana*) (for you) the cognizable aspect of knowledge is also not accepted (by us).

117c-18b. The¹⁹⁸ opinion that a similar¹⁹⁹ knowledge of the previous moment serves as the object-cause (of the next following knowledge) is also improper; for, no knowledge flashes up (*bhati*) immediately after a similar knowledge.

118c-19b. If²⁰⁰ the knowledge in the form of a visible object (*rupa*) arises due to contact with the knowledge of the sound, how will that knowledge of *rupa* be similar to the *alambana*, i.e. sound ?²⁰¹

119c-20b. Some²⁰² consider that a force (*sakti*) producing a knowledge akin to its content is the object-cause.²⁰³ This opinion is also improper; for, no force, *sakti* is reflected in the sensuous knowledge.

120c-21b. If²⁰⁴ (you again argue that) the objectivity lies in the cognizable part of knowledge and that alone remains invariably as the object, (we may reply that) the external thing (*artha*) (as the object) has been proved from the standpoint of the world and therefore its characteristic as *alambana* exists indeed though not expressly stated.

121c-22b. If²⁰⁵ you say that the force of knowledge is also quite familiar with the world, it is not definitely proved as the content (*artha*). If it lacks the characteristic²⁰⁶ (of *alambana*) how can it be *alambana*?

122c-23b. (Thus)²⁰⁷ it is proper to maintain on close scrutiny that the external object-cause alone is desirable on the authority of the world and scripture, but never the cognizable aspect of knowledge by any means.²⁰⁸

123c-24b. The²⁰⁹ objects like desirable and undesirable²¹⁰ never exist in the external in truth and hence all this is nothing but mind : this contention is absolutely irrelevant.

124c-25b. On²¹¹ certain unpleasant material object if one meditates as good (he experiences it as good); for, the result becomes distinguished with some benefaction on account of varied causes.²¹²

125c-26b. Certain²¹³ knowledge relating to an object (*artha*) reflects (the same object) as a patch of bluish (*vinilaka*) and immediately after that (the object) turns to be in the form of unpleasant thing, etc. (*duhkharpadi*) on account of meditation; likewise it may become otherwise on account of other causes.

126c-27b. Feelings²¹⁴ like joy, sorrow and dullness are all become differentiated by virtue of kinds of meditation but they never arise from any kind of external things—if this is your contention; how is it proper?

127c-28b. (The²¹⁵ Idealist continues) All your refutations are made on the assumption (of external things) (*aropa*); Why is it unreasonable to accept the truth of no *alambana* in the external? The external things we establish by virtue of their efficiency (*arthakriya*) and we negate them when there is no efficiency.

128c-30c. If²¹⁶ you say, even in the absence of the external things the purposive action²¹⁷ is achieved and therefore the external things are not accepted, then we may reply that we establish their existence not merely on account of their efficiency, but also on account of efficiency being witnessed even in the case of their perverted knowledge (*viparyaya-jnana*).

130d-31c. But²¹⁸ again as a result of securing the external things good or harm could be afflicted to the body; some sort of simple efficiency (*kriyamatra*)²¹⁹ is experienced even in the case of a mistaken notion (*vibhrama*) of some thing present for something absent.

131d-132c. As²²⁰ to the argument based on the sexual act (*kama-carita*)²²¹ in dream, we may say that the semen-discharge is a necessary phenomenon. If one has not that phenomenon, how can he be considered to have gained the sexual pleasure (one of the four purposes of human actions) ?

132d-133c. Since²²² the semen-discharge and the extreme passion (*raga*) are specially related (to each other) the former happens also on the occasion other than the dream; for example when one embraces a woman out of extreme love no contradiction is felt to the phenomenon of semen-discharge.

133d-134c. If,²²³ in the presence of a woman, the discharge happens out of extreme passion why does one not discharge the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream ?

134d-135c. If,²²⁴ in the absence of a woman, the discharge happens out of extreme passion, why does he not discharge the nail, the tooth, etc. as he discharges semen in dream ?

135d-136b. The²²⁵ semen being discharged out of extreme passion (*raga*) the purpose of life is fulfilled:—this idea is not a happy one.²²⁶

136d-137b. For²²⁷ example, when it is not spoken even as a simple act,²²⁸ the gain of the son, etc. that are experienced in dream as realities are all contradicted to the actually perceptual experiences.

137c-138c. Since²²⁹ there really exist the keepers²³⁰ of the hell, etc. as produced from the said acts, the system of everything as a reflected image of consciousness is neither admissible nor is any purposive action in dream possible. Therefore the doctrine of *Cittamatrata* “mind alone” becomes unproved.

138d-139c. When²³¹ different living bodies are evident for proving the existence of other minds, the existence of the hell also may likewise, be (entertained). On what evidence then do you deny the existence of other living beings ?²³²

139d-140c. Similarly²³³ the god (i.e. Garuda) bestowing the boon of reviving the life (*anugraha*) on the person who is dead on account venom poured out from the hood (of a serpent) remains true in his promise.²³⁴

140d-141b. In²³⁵ the absence of preliminary²³⁶ rites efficient act can not be accomplished; therefore that (efficient act) is not a simple creation of the mind.

141c-d. Why²³⁷ is the knowledge of the others' thought-discerner is untrue (*ayathartha*) ?²³⁸

142. When²³⁹ other's mind being present our knowledge enters into it (that knowledge is considered to be its cognizer). (or) when some object being present, the knowledge assumes the image²⁴⁰ of that object, then the knowledge is considered to be its cognizer.

143a-c. The²⁴¹ grasping of an object (by the mind) is not an act similar to that of running²⁴² towards its object, just immediately after which the knowledge would arise.

143d-144b. So²⁴³ also is the case with the knowledge of one's own mind.²⁴⁴ (In both the cases) the mind is regarded as cognizer in the manner above described (i.e. *pariccheda-laksana*).

144c-145b. The²⁴⁵ memory is a mind being directed towards the past thing. What is directed towards the past (*bhuta=yan-dag*) is not a cognition²⁴⁶ (*graha*) because that mind does not flash up from its cause.

145c-146b. The²⁴⁷ non-dual form (*advaya-rupa*) which is (supposed to be) domain of the well-awakened (*Sambuddha*) is not cognizable to us and therefore²⁴⁸ untrue (*ayathartha*). What is said to be untrue, is un-satisfactory because of the non-dual nature (*advayatvat*) of the knowledge.

146c-147b. The²⁴⁹ Buddha is Omniscient because he comprehends the entire cognizable universe through the agency of his cognizing knowledge, and not because he does so in a non-dual form.²⁵⁰

147c-148c. To²⁵¹ what is said (by Dignaga), viz. a non-describable form is cognized (by one's own self, we now ask:) What²⁵² is cognized by other person, is it possible to describe because the other's mind can be comprehended ?

148d-49. Then²⁵³ there exists definitely the object-cause in the external and therefore every mind is not at all (proved to be) objectless (*niralambana*). If the mind has not any cognizable in the external anywhere, how could one become omniscient ?²⁵⁴

150-151b. By²⁵⁵ comprehending one's own mind alone there may be nothing but the self-knowledge of the mind (*svasamvedana*).

If any one is supposed to be omniscient by merely comprehending one's own mind and he is known to be a separate individual then there would be no realisation of the mind alone (*cittamatra-darsana*).

151c-152b. If²⁵⁶ you think that this defect is obviated in view of the fact that the knowledge is non-dual in its nature, how, then does that (non-dual) knowledge comprehend its content ?

152c- (If²⁵⁷ you say again, that) when the knowledge becomes freed from every kind of dual form then it comprehends the universe in all aspects—this saying is indeed a matter of great wonder. Therefore there is one (i.e. omniscient) in the nature of comprehending (*grahaka-rupa*) (the entire universe).

153. There²⁵⁸ is not any person known to us as omniscient—says a self-styled wiseman²⁵⁹ amongst the so called learned persons; but this saying reveals his dull intellect (*sva-durmati*) being engrossed in it.

154. As²⁶⁰ the actual experiences dictate it is possible that as a result of contemplation on certain definite antidote the whole group of desire and other defilements are entirely destroyed.

155. But²⁶¹ there is hardly any possibility of applying an antidote in the case (of the Yogacara conception of emancipation; for the Yogacara holds) that the mind of all worldlings is under the firm grip of dual forms (subject and object) and this idea of dual form may be destroyed by contemplation on some object.

156. The²⁶² knowledge which flashes out in the form 'this is void (*sunya*)' is related to (lit. entered into) to the said dual forms and such knowledge being associated with dual forms; how can it serve as an antidote ?²⁶³

157. Just²⁶⁴ as one meditating on a desirable object does not destroy his desire, just so a man meditating on a thing in dual form does not destroy the idea of dual form.

158. Assuming²⁶⁵ in the mind an idea of entity²⁶⁶ one contemplates upon it of no-soul. But the principle of non-duality, a mere word has not any purpose (*nirartha*) and hence a contemplation upon it will be quite unnecessary.

159. The²⁶⁷ contemplation upon impermanence frees one quickly from the delusion of permanence. (-a reasonable proposition). (But in your system) by discarding every kind of perceptual experiences one necessarily secures Buddhahood (not a reasonable proposition).

160. The²⁶⁸ person who is free from every kind of perceptual experiences is completely inactive. Thus Buddhahood is desired (by you) without making any effort and practice.²⁶⁹

161. Therefore²⁷⁰ the state of well-faring (*Saugata-pada*) i.e. Buddhahood is secured on constant practice of compassion towards the sentient beings, doing good for them, and meditating on every manifested elements of existence as impermanent (*samas krta-anitya*).²⁷¹

162. When²⁷² one entertains the idea of mind alone, how could he fulfil the preliminary duties such as charity, etc. In the absence of charity there is no possibility of one obtaining the Buddhahood.

163. If²⁷³ you argue that under the influence of mutual causation and on the principle²⁷⁴ of mind-alone thought arises in the form of acts like giving and taking the charity. That cannot be proved either by perception, inference or reliable scripture. Such system is only a presumption and it is nothing but a verbal eloquence.

165. When²⁷⁵ one practises repeatedly and several times mentally a charity-thought (i.e. the thought in the form of charity) it never releases anybody from poverty.

166. Even²⁷⁶ if innumerable thoughts (*manaskara*) of Yogins are meditated upon (by us) neither happiness is gained nor misery is removed in reality.

167. In²⁷⁷ doling out everything (material) to all living beings and in fulfilling the charity of compassion there exists no distinction in the nature of things (*arthatmana=arthasyarupa*) however, in practising the compassion-charity we have a prohibitive injunction not to give certain²⁷⁸ things (viz. three garments, etc).

168. There²⁷⁹ was great Decease of the Buddha in the world and we have his relic now as his mortal remains. The mansion and monastery, etc. are witnessed by us; how can they be products of the mind-alone²⁸⁰ (lit. *paratantra*) ?

169. If²⁸¹ these things have no existence of their own how can we infer therefrom the great events of the past ? If the past events are not inferred, the whole system would be reduced into an extreme materialism (*lokayata*).

170. A²⁸² man witnessing the relics of the Saint who is purified through emancipation of the Sravaka, disciple becomes free from passions. If he has no recollection (lit. inference) of the past event, how can he entertain the faith (in his relics) ?

171. If²⁸⁴ (you say) it is produced by succession (*prabandha*) of people the life is seen to be cut off. If you again say that one continues to exist due to other, how would there be complete and last deliverance²⁸⁵ (*parinirvana*) ?

172. It²⁸⁶ is the settled fact in the worldly system that from the seed, etc. come up sprout, etc. and therefore there is not any sound reasoning for the plea that the whole universe is nothing but the mind.

173. When²⁸⁷ a knowledge arises immediately after a knowledge, the subsequent knowledge is the result of the previous knowledge-cause.²⁸⁸ This rule is also not permissible (in your system).

174. Thus,²⁸⁹ (e.g.) there would arise the knowledge of smoke in the absence of the knowledge of the²⁹⁰ fire, and also the knowledge of the sprout would arise from non-knowledge of the seed.

175. If²⁹¹ you plead that mind perfumed by the knowledge of the fire produces (lit. is the cause of) the knowledge of the smoke; when there are several potentialities (*sakti*) in the mind, wherefrom could arise the thought of distinction?

176. If²⁹² the cause immediately preceding knowledge (or mind) of fire is the cause of the mind of the smoke, that also is not good; for, the mind of fire is not definite (=concomitant) with the mind of smoke.

177. When²⁹³ the concomitance is completely unproved how do the people talk in the unmixed terms about the cause thus: this result arises from that cause?

178. Therefore²⁹⁴ the doctrine that the whole universe is *Chittamatra*, 'mind-alone' has been declared (by the Buddha) aiming at the imaginary or assumed aspect of the external things (*kalpitam asritya*) but not because the matter, etc. are improbable to exist.²⁹⁵

179. For²⁹⁶ what (object) one may display desire and other passions, Buddha viewing that object as merely an imaginary (*kalpita* = *Vikalpita*) has preached the doctrine of no-soul with reference to these (the assumed) things^{296a} in order to remove all such passions (*dosa*) of the worldlings.

180. Similarly²⁹⁷ in other places too the Buddha has stated that the external things do not exist in such forms as are assumed by the ordinary worldlings.²⁹⁸ Why is it so? (Buddha's knowledge) is superior to (that of ordinary worldlings).

181. Since²⁹⁹ some sort of agent has been just previously stated and the duties are understood alongside of the attachment

towards an agent as real the idea of agent as real is necessarily to be negated.³⁰⁰

182-183. In³⁰¹ other places it has been likewise declared thus : There is something inferred (*kalpita*) and some other thing fancied, *vikalpita* (= *parikalpita*). The true form of *dharmata* (*dharmata-rupa* = *gzugs* = form = *svarupa*) has been explained thus ; *dharmata* is *svalaksana*, self-essence. What is *kalpita* is no other than a basic reality (*bhavamatra*), and the *vikalpita* is its diversity (*bheda*). This diversity of *dharmata* will be inappropriate in the absence of *bhava*³⁰² (some basic entity, i.e. atoms).

184. If³⁰³ the Rupa is declared to be *sunya* (devoid of *rupa*-nature) how the term *rupa* is employed on it ? If you argue that it is done so on the assumption of the *rupa*-nature, what is the ultimate objective (*phala*) gained³⁰⁴ (therefrom) ?

185. Of³⁰⁵ what object any contradiction is impossible to exist that object thereby is verily existing.³⁰⁶ (But, for the opponents) since everything is non-existing their experiences are not really there as in the dream.³⁰⁷

186. The³⁰⁸ advocates of the external reality point out to the Idealist (*citta-matrata-vadin*) thus : Let the men of erudition investigate whether this (my conclusion) is just appropriate or not.

187. But³⁰⁹ I have no wonderful (wise) knowledge suited to investigate what is right and what is wrong ; I have however stated in brief the truths propounded by other masters.

188. The³¹⁰ wise men realize the destruction of ignorance darkness by means of the lustre of their true knowledge. Henceforth let the unlearned get purified in the path of the great men.

NOTES

1. This verse may be rendered into Sanskrit :

परिपूर्य च यः स्वार्थं परार्थं सर्वथाऽखलम् ।
अकरीतं प्रणम्यार्थसिद्ध्यावर्थी निरूप्यते ॥ १ ॥

2. In accordance with the tradition the author speaks of the Buddha as possessing two qualities, *svartha* and *parartha* as done by Vasubandhu (Kosa, I, ver. 1), Dignaga (Pram. Sam. I, ver. 1, with *vruttih. v*, my Review in ALB,) and the author of the *Sutralankara* (=Kalpanamandatika), Chap. I (v. my Sanskrit text, published in the journal of Sri Venkata. Institute, Tirupati, 1941).

3. स्वस्थनेत्रादिविज्ञानविषयार्थो न बाह्यकः ।
स्वप्नद्विचन्द्रधीकल्पो *a* ज्ञात्वादर्थविभासनात् ॥ २ ॥
a. lit ज्ञानत्वात्—*Jnanatva* as *Sadhana*, reason is referred to in the verse 29 below.

4. This is the conclusion arrived at in the *Vimśatika* and the *Alambana-pariksa*.

5. बाह्यार्थः साध्यते नेति बुद्धिमालत्ववादिना ।
अविसंवाददृष्ट्यादावस्तिवादस्तु कथ्यते ॥ ३ ॥

6. Dharmakirti's definition of *pramana* is: प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानम्, अर्थक्रियारितिः संवादनम्.....1 Pram. vartika, I, ver, 1. Subhagupta's one of the arguments to prove his externalism is *avisaṃvaditva*; cfr. Tatt. San. panjika. p. 574, ll. 20, ff.

7. ज्ञानस्य च वसंवादात् रूपादीनामयोगतः ।
आलम्बनं क्वचिन्न स्यात् उभयं तन्न शोभनम् ॥ ४ ॥

8. स्वाङ्गच्छेदादयो हृष्टाः स्वप्ने [ये] न भवन्ति ते ।
यद्यर्थनीतिनस्तीति प्रबुद्धस्य तथा *a* ननु ॥ ५ ॥
a = the word is used to bring out the Tib. expression: *mi-gyur-ram* implying a simple query.

9. कायस्कीतिः शिरश्छेदो वोधे स्वप्नसमा मता ।
इति चेत् त्वं कुतोह्यल यत्नवान् नष्टलाभयोः ॥ ६ ॥

10. The Realists, while opposing the extreme idealism, generally raises such objection as the present one to prove its absurdity. It may be interesting to Compare a European parallel: Dr.

Johnson is said to have expressed his opinion on Berkeley's philosophy by kicking "a stone with his foot and saying: No, Sir, I prove it wrong (Sir James Jean, *Mysterious Universe*, the Bridge series, p. 71).

11. आन्त्या सर्वप्रवृत्तिश्चेत् नास्ति नामविपर्ययः ।
अभ्रान्तमविसंवादि ज्ञानं a भ्रान्तं विसंवदेत् ॥ ७ ॥
a = विसंवादि भ्रास्यति ।
12. In the illusion there is always a perversion in naming things ; e.g. in rope-snake illusion the snake-name is mistaken for the rope-name.
13. देशात् कालादनन्यस्य ज्ञानं यत्र विसंवदेत् ।
तदभ्रान्तं पुनर्ज्ञानं नान्यदभ्रान्तलक्षणम् ॥ ८ ॥
14. The idea meant here is this: Time and space are not different from the material things, i.e. atoms; cp. *Nya. binda-pradipa* p.44. नीलमेव हि भास्मानं देशः नापरो देशः कश्चिदाभासते । and *Pram. va. bhasya*. p. 188: न देशो नामापरो रूपादिभ्यः। The Buddhists including the Sarvasti-vadin maintain that every thing is momentary and the moment is no other than the thing itself.
15. दीर्घसूक्ष्मादिकज्ञानात् योगीति तु विशेषितः ।
असर्वज्ञः प्रसज्येत नोभयतोभागमुक्तकः ॥ ९ ॥
विसंवदति बुद्धत्वम् ।
16. A partly definition of yogin.
17. This is explained in the Puggalapannatti, p. 145 : इधेकञ्चो पुगलो अटु विमोक्षे कायेन फुसित्वा विहरति । पञ्चाय चस्स दिस्वा आसवा परिक्षीणा होत्ति । अयं वुच्चति पुगलो उभतो भागविमुत्तो । Abh-kosa (Poussin, VI, p. 276) ; One who is entered in *Nirodhasamapatti* is named 'doubly delivered', because by force of *prajna* and *Samadhi* he is delivered from *klesa-avarana* and *vimoksa-avarana* (cp. 8 *vinoksas* in VIII, p. 205) Satya siddhi, chap. 163 (Eng. Summary) If he gains both, he is *ubhuyato-bhaga-vimukta*; for the defilement is one part and the element hindering dhyana-concentration is another part. (v. also chap. x. end) V. Magga (XXI para 78). अरूपज्ञानेन चेव अरियमग्नेन चाति उभतो भागेन विमुत्तो ति उभतो भागविमुत्तो……… ।

18. यथावदस्तिबो *a* धनाम् ।
 स्वप्नादिवच्च निखिलम्, विसंवादासंभवः कुतः ॥ १० ॥
a=अस्तीति यथावत्प्रतीतिः ।

19. दृढ्वासनया चेत् स्यात् उक्तः स्वप्नश्च नो कुतः ।
 ग्रामारामप्रभेदाद्या दृश्यभूतास्ततः पुनः ॥ ११ ॥

20. अनिन्द्रियार्थादिबुद्धिवासनाक्षणिकत्वतः ।
 विपाकाप्तिव्यवहिता ह्यक्षार्था दृढ्वेततः ॥ १२ ॥

21. It is difficult to understand the author's intention here. According to Abh. kosa theory of momentariness is applicable to the elements both internal and external. It is the Theravadin who makes a distinction in applying it to the elements and pleads that the material elements continue to exist for 17 thought-moments (v, Abh. Athasan, IV. 86. Kosambi's Tika, p. 67). Despite the momentary-theory the Vaibhasika maintains that karman produces its fruits through *avijnapti* which continues to exist on the support of four great elements (v. kosa, I. 11). This may not hold good in the Yogacara system.

22. यस्य ज्ञानमेकरसमिन्द्रियार्थान्न जायते ।
 तस्य तस्य स्वभावच्च [2036] किं ध्रुवोऽथवा ॥ १३ ॥

23. *Ekarasa-jnana*=advaya-jnana of the Yogacara which is dichotomized into subject and object due to premordial force, (*anadi-vasara*). It is somewhat similar to the Sautrantika's *ekarasa-skandha*=*jnana*, v. Masuda, sects p. 68 with note 1.

24. निद्रादिसाम्यवत्त्वाच्चेत् तद्विपाककरो न किम् ।
 विद्यमाने *a* पाकहेतौ न युक्तः पाकसंक्षयः ॥ १४ ॥
a=*Jnana-svabhava*.

25. दृष्ट रूपे निद्रितस्य नोर्ध्वं *a* मस्ति तृतोऽवध्रुम्
 सम्भवति यथा तेन परिप्रकातमनः क्षयः ॥ १५ ॥
a=Tib. de-ma-phyir-mi-brten-shin.

26. *a* यस्येन्द्रियार्थवैकल्यात् देशनाकारणं न च ।
 (तस्य) पुनविपाकाप्तियोग्या स्याच्च परिक्षयात् ॥ १६ ॥
a=Read in Tib. *gan.-gi* for *gan-gis*.

27. The idea seems to be this: when the Yogacara denies the external things, there will be no occasion for preaching dharma or listening to it and arousing the right view which leads to the destruction of Vipaka. Dharmakirti, however, defends his position thus: केवलं लोकबुद्धयैव बाह्यचिन्ता प्रवर्तते । Pram, va. ver. 220.

28. दृढः a वादवास्यत्वात् क्रियते च कुतो मतम् ।
 रूपादीनामयोग्यत्वादिति चेत् वाच्यमुत्तरम् b ॥ १७ ॥
 a=दृढ़विसंवाद वासनया ।
 b=See the verse 29.

29. परिपाकाश्रयतयाऽविसंवादः प्रबोधने ।
 तिमिरमाश्रयो यावत्तावन्नाऽसंवादः कुतो न च ॥ १८ ॥
 a=नासंवाद-अविसंवादः

30. The knowledge of the eye-diseased person (*taimirika*) is, however, contradicted at once.

31. तद्बुद्ध्या तु प्रवृत्तेश्च भ्रान्तालम्बनतोऽन्तरा ।
 तद्बुद्ध्यस्त्वेऽविसंवादात् न तद्बुद्धिकृतमिष्यते ॥ १९ ॥

31a. cp. Nya, bindu-Tippani, p. 19 : सर्वमालम्बने । भ्रान्त मुक्त्वा ताथागत-ज्ञानम् । Every perceptual knowledge is illusive so far as its object is concerned.

32. आरोपपरिपाकस्य शक्ते वर्स्त्वन्तरोद्भवात् ।
 स्वात्मतो जायते नैव कुसुमाच्च तिलं यथा ॥ २० ॥

33. This Sakti, according to the Idealist comes into existence from the self of consciousness and not from some other external causes.

34. अबादिभ्यो यथा a बीजं यज्ञातं यत एव च ।
 समानं तत्र तेनैव फलोत्पत्तेश्च वासना ॥ २१ ॥
 नारोप्या धूमतेजोवत्

a=जायते is to be added from the previous sentence.

35. This is probably *anadikalika-vasana* accepted by the Idealists to account for the universal causation *cfr*, Madh. avatara, VI, ver. 46 with Bhasya, my sanskrit text, p. 42-43; Bud. Logic II, p. 367 with note 3 and p. 400 Jinendrabudhi's comment: Every notion of causation is produced by Biotic Force; and Alambanapariksa, ver. 8.

36. वस्त्वन्तरोद्भवात् किञ्चित् कर्मणो वास्यते यथा ।
जातीपुष्पंश्च संसृष्ट्या गन्ध उत्पद्यते तिले ॥ २२ ॥

37. Jati flower as a factor in producing fragrance is a common example in Indian Sastraic literature, *cp.* Kosavy. II p.39. 22

38. तत्रोपादानविज्ञानाज्ञायते ज्ञानसप्तकम् ।
तत्र तद्वीज आरोप्य स्थितश्चपि विपच्यते ॥ २३ ॥

39. अतो भावान्तराज्ञातो मावो नास्तीति वासना ।
नारोप्य वर्धनायोग्या इत्याह शाक्तविज्ञनः ॥ २४ ॥

40. Here Sakti-vadin is the Sautrantika. According to him seven kinds of consciousness (five sensuous, one non-sensuous consciousness and one mind) are produced from their *upadana* consciousness, a subtle mind in possession of all seeds, something resembling the Alaya-consciousness of the yogacarin. The sautrantika contradicts the vasana theory postulated by the latter on the assumption that nothing is produced from anything but the mind = Alaya-consciousness, or the Sautrantika's subtle mind, *v. Et.* Lamotte, *Histoire du Buddhisme*, p. 673; and Masuda, *Sects* p. 68. The kosa speaks of the seven types of *vijnana* in this line : षष्ठिज्ञानान्यथो मनः/ (I, 16).

We may note here a parallel discussion between the Yogacara and the Sautrantika as reproduced by the Stcherbatsky from Vacaspati's *Nyayakanika* : (The Yogacara:) (The external object is superfluous, there is in the internal) Biotic force which accidentally becomes mature and evokes an idea ; this is also accidental (and changing concomitantly with a change its cause). (The Sautrantika:) But, is it not your Biotic force in this case simply the force of the subject thought contained in one continuous stream, the force to produce out of itself, a corresponding the objective thought, *Bud. Logic*, II. p. 367-68). One interesting reference to the Sautrantika may be noticed here : सौतान्तिकनयेन त्वविरोध एव । यरमादस्य संस्कारपरिभविताः षष्ठिज्ञान कायाः संस्कारप्रत्ययं विज्ञानमिष्टं न प्रतिसन्धिविज्ञानमेवेति । *Arthaviniscaya Sutratika*. The idea probably meant here that the six consciousness-bodies are conditioned by Samskara, a subtle Sakti formed from the experience of external things ; *cp.* the ver. 27 below the same idea.

41. स्वतन्त्रादय जायेताविग *a* मज्जानमत च ।
 यथोप वीजं पच्येत् तेन तुल्यं ममापि चेत् ॥ २५ ॥
a = प्रवृत्तिविज्ञान ।

42,

43. पक्षस्यास्य विरुद्धत्वादुपदाज्ञाननिश्चयः ।
 उमयोस्तुत्यमितिचेत् न युक्तोऽन्योऽन्यनिश्चयः ॥ २६ ॥

44. Pravrtti-vijnana depends on upadana-vijnana and the latter again on the former to produce it.

45. यस्येन्द्रियार्थं ज्ञानैरारोप्यन्ते च शक्तयः ।
 दिक्कालकायादीनात्त्वं विशेषात् *a* परिवृद्धिताः ॥ २७ ॥
 तस्य पक्षे न दोषोऽस्ति,
a = परिणामिताः ।

46. This is the Sautrantika's standpoint, v. ver. 24, 76.

47. यस्योपादाननामकात्
 ज्ञानादन्यत् कारणं न प्रतिबन्धो न तस्य च ॥ २८ ॥

48. This is the system of the Yogacara. Alaya is named *upadana*, cfr. Trimsatika, ver. 3 with Bhasya of Sthiramati.

49. धीमालत्वेन संसाध्ये यत् ज्ञानत्वादिसाधनम् ।
 विजातीयाविरुद्धत्वात् सर्वं शेषवदुच्यते ॥ २९ ॥

This verse is cited in Tatt. pan. p. 582.

50. Sesavadanumana = vaidharmyavat, v. Bud. Logic. II. p. 208, n. 1.

51. प्रेक्षा *a* तुष्टि *b*: प्रवृत्तिश्च *c* हितापिरहितव्ययः ।
 प्रबुद्धव्यवहाराश्च न स्वप्ने सन्ति सर्वथा ॥ ३० ॥
a = सुनिष्पणम् *b*, Tib. *dgah. mgur.* *c*. lit. हिताहितयोर्लभानी,

52. प्रतिबाधावशान्नाम भ्राम्यति ज्ञानमक्षजम् ।
 विनापि तां भ्राम्यतीति सर्वं सृष्टं तमः खलु ॥ ३१ ॥

53. According to the Yogacara every human knowledge is illusive with reference to its object (v. note 31a above). The author asserts that knowledge can be illusive if it is vitiated in a later stage.

54. अन्ये सर्वत्र विज्ञानमर्थधीर्मानसो भ्रमः ।
 ज्ञेयं रवचित्तजातं यत् रूपं वा नास्ति तस्य च ॥ ३२ ॥

55. This and the following are the opoinions of Dignaga, v. Alam. pariksa, ver. 6.

56. अर्थो नास्तीति संसाध्यमेकैकस्यापरिच्छदेः ।
नाष्टाभासमिति प्राहः ।

57. This is the main argument set up by Dignaga in favour of his idealism, v. Alam. par. ver. 1.

58. चित्तचैतसिकैरपि ॥ ३३ ॥
सन्दिग्धता भवेदेव यथा च क्षणभृत्यगुराः ।
एकैका नावभासन्ते तथागतपरिच्छदिः ॥ ३४ ॥
निर्धारिता नाणवः स्तुः ।

This verse is made of 5 lines, the next four lines being traced to the original Sanskrit. The implied *hetu* is *ekaika-apariccheda*.

59. तुल्यापरक्षणोत्पाद्यथानित्यत्वविभ्रमः ।
अविच्छिन्नसजातीयग्रहे स्यान्नीलविभ्रमः ॥ ३५ ॥

Tatt. san. p. 552 cites this verse with the reading स्थूलविभ्रम for नाल—. The Panjika further quotes his comments thus: सह्याह—यथा सदृशापरापरक्षणोत्पादाद्विप्रलब्धस्य गृहीतेऽपि प्रत्यक्षेण शब्दादौ नित्यत्वविभ्रमः । तथा परमाणुनामविच्छिन्नदेशानां सजातीयानां स्थूल इति मानसो विभ्रमो भवति । (Cp. p. 199 and ver. 589). It is interesting to note the difference in readings. Kamalasila thinks that *nila* is empirically real from the Sautrantika standpoint of view but *sthula* is unreal. Subhagupta, on the other hand, thinks that *sthula* is a real substance rather than *nila*, a quality, derivative element. The idea may be clear if we look into the discussion in Kosa, IV, 8—12 on *Samsthana*.

60. बुद्ध्या सदा त्वविच्छिन्नसजात्यग्रहणे सति ।
विकल्पकेन ज्ञानेन हेयकत्वमवसीयते ॥ ३६ ॥

61. The idea of oneness as illusive is explained in Tatt. san. ver. 598-9. Similarly the idea of grossness as illusive in ver. 592-4 (Ibid). This latter position is of the Sautrantika.

62. अतः स्वलक्षणत्वेन विज्ञाने परमाणवः ।
आभासन्ते नेति वादो यः सर्वो न स सिद्ध्यति ॥ ३७ ॥

63. The opinion of Vasubandhu, Vimsatika, ver. 11, and also of Dignaga, Alam. par, ver. 1.

64. यदाभासं ततो [204¹] नास्ति द्रव्याभावाद्विचन्द्रवत् ।
इति सिद्धं वादिनो यत् ना चाल हेतुनिश्चयः ॥ ३८ ॥

65. *cp. Alam. par. ver. 2:* Pram. sam. I, ver.

66. संयुक्ता येऽणवः सन्तः समार्नकक्रियाकराः ।
ते सञ्चिताऽप्ति प्रोक्तु रद्रव्याणाति ते कुतः ॥ ३६ ॥
a = Tib. *hdus. pa.*

67. The author thinks that *Sancita* atoms are *dravya*, substance since they discharge a uniform function. The same opinion in his *Anyapoha-vicara*, ver. 2. The logical school of Dignaga following the Sautrantika standpoint defines *dravya* as one capable of discharging a perposive action : *artha-kriya-ksamam vastu-taksanam*. v. *Tatt. pan.* p. 730, (18; *Nya. bindu Tika* p. 76-7.) *cp. pram. var. III, ver. 195:*
अर्थान्तराभिसम्बन्धात् जप्यते योऽणवोऽपरे ।
उक्तास्ते सञ्चितास्ते हि निमित्तं ज्ञानजन्मनः ॥
It may be noted here that the opinion of *Sancita*-*anu* as the object of consciousness is attributed to the Neo-Sarvastevadin, (Sanghabhadra) by Kuei. chi. v. my forthcoming edition of the *Alam. par.*

68. एकशब्दाभिधेयास्ते न तेषामेकतास्ति तु ।
विचार्यमाणः शब्दार्थो न भातीन्द्रियचेतसि ॥ ४० ॥

69. The same idea in the author's *Anyapoha-vicara*, ver. 7. *cp. Tatt. san. ver. 870.*
यस्य यस्य हि शब्दस्य यो यो बिषय उच्यते स संविद्यते नैव वस्तुनां सा हि धर्मता ॥
with *Pan.* citing the *Bhavasankrati*, ver. 9: येन येन हि नाम्ना वै यो यो धर्माभिलिप्यते । नासौ संबद्धते तत्र धर्माणां सा हि धर्मता ॥
धर्मता प्रकृतिः । सवावाक्पथातीतत्वं वस्तुनां स्वभावः (स्वलक्षणम्) इति यावत् ।

70. यस्य बुध्देरेकभागो भात्याकार इतीरणम् ।
ईक्षितं तस्य नियतं चिनास्तरणमन्तरा ॥ ४१ ॥

71. This very instance compells the Yogacara to declare that the images that are reflected in our consciousness are all false (*alika*) v. *Tatt. pan. ad ver. 20 37:* ज्ञानादव्यतिरिक्तत्वान्नाकारबहुता भवेत् । ततश्च तद्वलेनास्ति नाथं संवेदनस्थितिः । आकाराव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् ज्ञाने वा अनेकता भवेत् । अन्यथा कथमेकत्वमनयोः परिकल्प्यते । चिनास्तरणदर्शने एकस्मात् ज्ञानादव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् ज्ञानस्वरूपवदाकाराणां बहुता न प्राप्नोति । एवमाकाराव्यतिरिक्तत्वात् ज्ञानस्याप्यनेकता प्राप्नोति । p. 571, *cp. p. 181,*

ver. 536. साकारे ननु विज्ञाने....। A thorough examination of this topic from the Yogacara standpoint has been made by Ratna-kirti in his *Citra-advaita-prakasa-vada*. (v. Ratnakirtinibandha, K. P. J. Institute, Patna, 1957.

Dharmakirti from the standpoint of his logic offers this explanation: Our practical experiences dictate that several non-sensuous consciousnesses can arise simultaneously; v. Pram. var. नानार्थिका भवेत् तस्मात् सिद्धाऽतोविकल्पिका । विकल्पयन्नप्येकार्थं यतोऽन्यदपि पश्यति । cp. vers; Ibid, 197-201; Tatt. san. ver. 1253; अतः सर्वत्र विषये न क्रमग्रहणं भवेत् । सकृदग्रहण-भासस्तु भवेत् शब्दादिबोधवत् । etc.

Another explanation is offered in the following lines: यत् यथा भासते ज्ञानं तत् तथैवामुभूयते । इति नामैकभावः स्यात् चिलाकारस्य चेतसः ॥ Pram. var. III, 222. Bhasya: तस्मात् ग्राह्यहक्तीलाग्राद्याकारा चिला बुद्धिरेकैवेति चिलाद्वैतमेव । p. 290.

Dharmakirti further argues as another solution that several things can produce simultaneously one cognition: को वा विरोधो बहवः सञ्चितातिशयाः सकृत् । भवेयुः कारणं बुद्धेर्यदि नात्मेन्द्रियादि वत् ॥ Ibid, 224. Bhasya: यथेन्द्रियार्थमनस्कारा आत्मेन्द्रियार्थसञ्चिकर्षा वा सकृदेकमिन्द्रियविज्ञानं जनयन्ति । तथा परमाणवोऽपि । को विरोधः । p. 296. Kosa (IV. 10) also refers to the *citrastarana* problem. v. Note, 178 for the author's solution.

72. क्वचिच्च कस्य च दूष्येकाकारग्रहो यदि ।
स उच्चनीचाश्रयतो भिन्नचित्ता a वभासकः ॥ ४२ ॥
a—Tib. *bkra-ba*—चित्र, variegated.
73. A similar explanation in T. Panji. p. 571, l. 16, v. note 178 below the passage/एवमेकाकारेऽपि....।
74. एकज्ञानाभकोऽणुर्यो विनान्योन्यमनुद्भवात् ।
तस्याकारस्य विच्छेदे एकैकं भास्यते कथम् ॥ ४३ ॥
75. Atoms appear and disappear together: सहोत्पद्यन्तो सह विरूप्यन्ते । This is what the Sarvastivadi-Vaibhasikas conclude. It is further made clear in the next verse, cp. kosa, I. p. 35, ll. 18-20, and Vis. Mag: गन्धा रसो फस्सो चतस्सो चेव धातवो । अद्वेते अविणिभागा एकुप्पादा सहव्यया ॥

v. my paper on Nilakesi, Annals of Research Institute, Tirapati, IV, p. 61. Tatt. sangraha defenus that the atoms though invisible individually, become the object of perception ; v ver. 570.

76. प्रत्येकपरमाणुनां स्वातत्त्वयेणास्त्यसम्भवः ।
अतोऽपि परमाणुनामेकैकाप्रतिभासनम् ॥ ४४ ॥
This verse is cited in T. Panji. p. 551, l. 21: अथापि स्यात् समुदिता एवोत्पद्यन्ते विनश्यन्ति चेति सिद्धान्तान्तैकपरमाणुप्रतिभास इति । यथोक्तम् ।

77. अणु दिग्भागमेदात्र नेति यत् तदसङ्गतम् ।
अणौ दिक्शब्द उच्येत केनचित् सविशेषणे ॥ ४५ ॥
The second line of this verse is cited in prose in T. panji. p.556, cp. n. 79 below.

78. The author refers here to Vasubandhu's criticism of atomic theory in his Vimsa. ver. 12, 14 :
षट्केन युगपद्योगा त्परमाणोः षडंशता ।
षण्णां समानदेशत्वात् पिण्डः स्यादणुमालकः ॥
दिग्भागमेदो यस्यास्ति तस्यैकत्वं न युज्यते ।
Some similar criticism has also been made by him in the kosabhasya, I. ver, 43. Tib. pp. 81-84. and the Vaibhasika's defence.

79. दिग्भागमेदेनातस्तः बहुभिः परिवारिताः ।
कथिता अणवश्चैव न तु सावयवात्मकाः ॥ ४६ ॥
cp. T. panji. p. 555: भदन्तशुभगुस्स्तु प्राह—यथैकस्वभावस्यासदद्रव्या-दिव्यावृत्तस्यानेकं सामान्यं न तत्वेन कल्प्यते । एवमिहापि परमाणुनामनेक-वर्त्तित्वादनेकत्वं कल्प्यते, न भूतार्थेन । तथाहि-न दिक्शब्दो नामास्ति कणादादिक-लिपतः । तस्यैकस्वरूपत्वादनेकरूपः पूर्वादिप्रत्ययो न स्यात् । केवलमणव एव पौर्वापर्येणावस्थिता दिक्शब्दवाच्याः । ततश्च दिग्भागमेदवत्वात् इति केवलं बहुभिः परिवारणमेवोक्तं स्यत् न सावयवत्वम् इति ।

80. The same idea in the ver. 8 above, cp. note 14.

81. एकोऽनुरब्दे भागे स्थितोऽन्यः परभागतः ।
उभाभ्यामपि भागाभ्यां प्रसक्ता न द्विवाऽनवः ॥ ४७ ॥
cp. Vimsa, bhasya: अन्यो हि परमाणोः पूर्वदिग्भागो यावदधोदिग्भाग इति दिग्भागमेदे सति कथं तदात्मकस्य परमाणोरेकत्वं योक्ष्यते । The present verse answers this objection.

82. अनेकमध्यवर्तित्वादनेकत्वं विकल्प्यते ।

व्यतिरेकमुखादेवमनेकत्वं प्रकल्प्यते ॥ ४८ ॥

The idea of this verse is also included in the prose passage above cited in n. -79. व्यतिरेक-एकत्वव्यावृत्ति. This explanation suggests idea of manifoldness on the atom is imaginary as the idea of the oneness on the aggregate.

83. तत्त्वापेक्षान्यदयन्न रूपं वै गृह्णते यथा ।

नैव तद्विद्याते तत्त्वादिभेदवत् ॥ ४६ ॥

84. The explanation is made here of how an invisible atomic form becomes a visible gross form.

85. नैरन्तर्याद्वृत्तनाश्चावयवित्वं यदीप्यते ।

निरन्तराः पूर्वपरक्षणा न तादृशाः कथम् ॥ ५० ॥

86. If the latter proposition is acceptable, the former one also will be so.

87. ज्ञानस्य द्विक्षणस्थित्वान्तर्यं ततोऽस्ति च ।

यथा त्ववयविरूपं नेष्यते वै तथाणुषु ॥ ५१ ॥

88. The advocate of knowledge of two and more moments, duration is probably the Naiyayika. The Theravadin pleads that it exists for three moments, v, Abh. San. IV.

89. Atoms, though existing in an uninterrupted series are not conceived as one *avayavin* on the analogy of knowledge.

90. प्रत्यासत्या क्याचित् गतिबाधो गतीमतः ।

तथैवाच्छादनं प्रोक्तमव्यवान्तरतो न तु ॥ ५२ ॥

91. This is in reply to Vasubandhu's criticism : सान्तरत्वे गतिमतां गतिः केन प्रतिषिद्धते । Kosabhasya, I. 43. This answer implies that the author is a *Santara-paramanu-vadin*.

92. आच्छादने संति च्छाया समुत्पन्ना च विद्यते ।

च्छाया दिनकरण्वोश्च मध्यलग्ना न युज्यते ॥ ५३ ॥

93. This answers Vasubandhu's query : छायावृत्ती कथं वा Vimsa. 14.

94. छायाच्छादनयोः शक्ति बहूनां जायते यथा ।

परमाणुष्वपि तथा नैकस्मात् सर्वथाऽपि तु ॥ ५४ ॥

95. अतो भेदस्य नास्तित्वात् पिण्डो नास्तीति यद्वचः ।
कादाचित्कं भवेत्तच्चेत् *a*परिणामो न युज्यते ॥ ५५ ॥ *a*=parinama=
hgyur. ba.

96. *cp.* Vimsa. 12d: पिण्डः स्यादणुमालकः ।

97. अन्योन्यमात्माऽसंसृष्टा अनंशाश्र व्यवस्थिताः ।
अतः सञ्चित्य भवति पृथिवीमण्डलादिकम् ॥ ५६ ॥

98. This makes clear that the author holds the opinion that atoms do not contact with one another. Read in Tib. *reg. pa* for *rig. pa*.

99. परस्परानुग्रहस्य विशेषात् *a*परिणामिताः ।
पराणवश्र वज्रादेन विच्छिन्ना भवन्ति ते ॥ ५७ ॥
a=*hgyur. ba. v.* Madh. vrtti, p. 7.

100. पिशाचसप्तप्रभुतेर्मन्तशक्त्या ग्रहो यथा ।
*a*संज्ञच्छन्तेऽणवः केचित् द्रव्यशक्त्या परस्परम् ॥ ५८ ॥
a=*brgyus. pa* ग्रथित S. Das, Dictionary.

101. अन्येऽल्पशक्तिबलकाः ; बुद्धिमानचलादिगः ।
संख्यादिप्रविशेषेण कल्पयेन्नरकाद्यणून् ॥ ५९ ॥

102. It appears that there are millions of atoms having no capacity strong enough to come into combination and to form any visible object.

103. The Yogin can count the number of atoms even of the hell, etc. remote objects. The expression: *acaladigah* is again used later in ver. 64 below.

104. अतो नास्तीति नो युक्तम् ; उक्तं भ्रान्तिवशाद्यदि ।
षष्ठीमालतांबो घः *a* यथा॒ष्टपरमाणुषु ॥ ६० ॥
संख्यादि भ्रान्तिस्तपन्ना ; *a*—भ्रान्तिवशात् इति शेषः ।

105. The idea may be amplified thus : If my apprehension of atoms by outer senses is illusive, your understanding of the mind alone with equally be illusory. Here the author's reference to the mind as the sixth sense is suggestive of the fact that the mind understands always what is apprehended by the outer senses. *Cp.* the Saying ; द्वाभ्यां भिक्षवो रूपं गृह्यते चक्षुर्विज्ञानेन तदाकृष्टेन मनसा च । cited in Nya-Tippani, p. 26.

106. प्रतीतिस्तस्य सा तथा ।
 यदि सत्त्वसमत्वेन नरकादिविदो *a* धनात् ॥ ६१ ॥
 परमाणोरनाभासात् प्रतीतिस्तस्य सा यदि ।
 अस्ति च भ्रान्तितोऽन्य स्य *b*; प्रधानपुरुषादिषु ।
 कस्मादनुकृ भवति संख्याद्याकारलक्षणम् ॥ ६२ ॥
a=lit. विज्ञान *b* = अन्यत will be a better reading.

107. The Yogacara conceives the mind as the basis of illusion of the whole universe; thus the mind is a real entity while the objective universe is illusory.

108. The Yogacara's conception of the hell is well explained in the Vimsa-bhasya ad. 4. Read my English translation of the treatise and a bilingual edition of the textes with notes from Vinitadeva's comments (Institute of Tibetology, Gangtok, 1964).

109. The author thinks; As you (opponents) declare the atoms, etc. as illusory, why do you not say likewise of the Pradhana and Purusa as illusory ?

110. तदवस्था च संप्राप्ता गुणातिशयसमते: ।
 भ्रान्त्या विकल्पितत्वेऽपि न त्याज्या पूर्वकल्पना ॥ ६३ ॥

111. अणुश्च तस्मादस्त्येव अचलादिग्रीषीमतः ।
 ततोऽन्येनागृहीतः ते जानन्तीति कल्प्यते ॥ ६४ ॥

112. The same expression previously in ver. 59. n. 103.

113. सहोपलभ्नियम उक्तो यत्पुरुषद्वये ।
 ज्ञानज्ञेयस्वभावश्च नियमात् सह वैद्यते ॥ ६५ ॥

114. T. Panji. explains *Jnana-Jneya-svabhava* thus: विषयविषयिभावेन नियतत्त्वादन्यथापि सहोपलभ्नियम सम्भवत्येव । यतो ज्ञानस्य ग्राहक एव स्वभावः विषयग्रहणधर्मक्त्वात्तस्य, विषयस्यापि तद्ग्राह्य एव स्वभावः । तयोर्श्रीकसामग्रयधीनत्वात् नित्यं सहभाविता । न च सहोत्पावाविशेषेऽपि चक्षुरादीनां द्विषयत्वप्रसङ्गः तथाविघ्नस्वभावाभावात् । तथा हि सामग्रं या नीलादिविषयाध्यवसायरूपमेव ज्ञानं जन्यते न चक्षुराद्यध्यवसायरूपम् । नीलादिरपि तु तदध्यवसीयमानरूपो जनितो न चक्षुरादिरिति । आह च नान्योऽस्ति ग्राहकोऽस्ति । p. 569.

115. नान्योऽस्ति ग्राहको ज्ञानात् चाक्षुर्य विषयेविना ।
 अतश्च सहसंवित्तिनभेदान्नीलतद्वियोः ॥ ६६ ॥

This is cited in T. Panji. v. note. 114. end.

116. *a*ग्राहकश्चेत्त विज्ञानं ज्ञानं वा विषयैर्विना ।
तदा ततु तथा वक्तुं युज्यते नान्यथा पुनः ॥ ६७ ॥
a=lit. अग्राहक.

117. What is implied in the previous verse is made clear here, viz. in the absence of either of the two, knowledge or the object no cognition flashes out and that is the reason why they are felt simultaneously.

118. एककालविवक्षातः सम्बुद्धज्ञानचेतसा ।
चित्तचैत्तश्च हेतुर्हि सर्वर्थैकान्तिको न च ॥ ६८ ॥
This verse is cited in T. Panji (p. 568, 1, 4) in prose: अथ सहशब्द एककालविवक्षया तदा बुद्धिज्ञेयचित्ते ने चित्तचैत्तश्च सर्वर्था अनैकान्तिकता हेतोः । यथा किल बुद्धस्य भगवतो यद्विज्ञेयं सन्तानान्तरचित्तं तस्य बुद्धज्ञानस्य च सहोपलभ्नियमेऽपि अस्त्येव नानात्वम् । तथा चित्तचैत्तानां सत्यपि सहोपलभ्ने कैक्त्वमित्यतोऽनैकान्तिको हेतुरिति ।

119. आगमेभ्यश्च सिद्धत्वात् चेत्तानां भ्रान्तिता न चेत् ।
पिशाचनरकादीनां ज्ञानं उक्तः कुतो भ्रमः ॥ ६९ ॥

120. The author probably intends to say thus: The ghost, the hell, etc. are equally spoken off in the scripture, why do you say that our knowledge of these things is an illusion?

121. असत्यपि सम्बन्धे विशेष इष्टकृद्यदि ।
तमसिद्धमनिच्छुश्च परीहरसि विभ्रमात् ॥ ७० ॥

122. सहशब्दश्च लोकेऽस्मिन् नैवान्येन विना क्वचित् ।
विरुद्धोऽयं ततो हेतुर्यद्यस्ति सहबेदनम् ॥ ७१ ॥
Kamalasila introducing this verse remarks: तत्र भद्रन्तशुभगुप्तस्त्वाह-विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुः यस्मात्-सहशब्दश्च This objection is also noticed by Dharmapala in his comment an Alam. par.

123. एकार्थः सहशब्दश्रेदन्यतोऽसिद्धतो तदा ।
कथं साधारणे भाव एकेनैव च दर्शनम् ॥ ७२ ॥

124 T. Panji, refers to this idea of oneness and its implications thus:
पुनः स एवाह यदि सहशब्द एकार्थः तदा हेतुरसिद्धः । तथाहि नटचन्द्रभल्प्रेक्षासु नहयेकेनैवोपलभ्नमो नीलादेः । नापि नीलतदुपलभ्नयोरेकेनैवोपलभ्नः । तथाहि नीलोपलभ्नेऽपि तदुपलभ्नानामन्यसन्तानगतानामनुपलभ्नात् । यदा च सत्त्वं (sic) प्राणभृतां सर्वे चित्तक्षणाः सर्वज्ञेनावसीयन्ते । तदा कथमेकेनैवोलभ्नः सिद्धः स्यात् । किञ्चान्योपलभ्ननिषेधे सति एकोपलभ्ननियमः सिद्ध्यति । न चान्योपलभ्नप्रतिषेध-सम्भवः । स्वभावविप्रकृष्टस्य विधिप्रतिषेधायोगात् ।

125. सर्वज्ञानवेद्यश्च सर्वं चित्तं भवेद्यदि ।
 एकेनैवोपलभ्यते तदोक्तः कुत्रि सिध्यति ॥ ७३ ॥
 The idea expressed in this verse is well state in T. Panji passage cited in the previous note.

126. आलम्बननिषेधोऽन्यैः प्रमाभावान्न सिध्यति ।
 स्वभावविप्रकृष्टस्य सन्दिग्धासिद्धता ततः ॥ ७४ ॥
 The idea of this verse has been summed up in T. Panji. passage cited in the note 124.

127. बाह्याभावतः सिद्धौ स्वैकभागे विलोकिते ।
 वदतश्चित्तमात्रं तत्प्रसिद्धो हेतुरेव हि ॥ ७५ ॥

128. Thus the reason becomes *anyatara-asiddha*.

129. अपृथग्भाससंसिद्धौ [206 a] भवेत्सिद्धस्य साध्यता ।
 साकारज्ञानकथिनो विवादस्तत्र नो भवेत् ॥ ७६ ॥

130. For the advocate of *sakara jnana*, the image is a part of the knowledge. To prove it is useless.

131. एक एव पदार्थश्चेदालम्बनं प्रवल्प्यते ।
 ज्ञानरूपाद्विवेकेन कथं सवेद्यमेव तत् ॥ ७७ ॥

132. अर्थालम्भे a कृष्णशङ्खे b तुष्ट्यस्य c वेदनाश्च ताः ।
 यदि ज्ञानस्वरूपस्य; विना वित्ति न सम्भवेत् ॥ ७८ ॥
 a=अर्थोपलब्धौ. b. No case-ending in Tib. c. dgah. bai.

133. The author appears to mean this: If the experience of the black shell consist, in the nature of knowledge alone, the knowledge should then be experienced as black. Since the black colour cannot be attributed to the knowledge, there ought to be something black material other than the knowledge. The classical example is: *pitah sankhah*. This example of *bhrama jnana* seems to be purposely employed in order to point out that there are two aspects of the object, viz, black and the shell which cannot be accommodated in the only knowledge.

134. यदि रूपं कल्पितश्च किञ्चिदेव हि वेद्यते ।
 न वेद्यते ज्ञानरूपमित्यतस्तन्न युज्यते ॥ ७९ ॥

135. तेन रूपद्वयं वेद्यं चन्द्रमायुगलं यथा ।
 शास्त्रकर्तुरेकमिति प्रसिद्धं तन्न युज्यते ॥ ८० ॥

136. I.e. One imaginary form and the other real. Similar objection in T. panji. p. 574, ver. 2051. *cp. my paper on Bud. Idealism. Tirupati Institute, Journal, I, pt. 3. p. 83.*

137. पूर्वकैव तु सामग्री प्रज्ञानं विषयक्षणम् ।
सालोकरूपवत् कुर्यात् येन स्यात् सहवेदनम् ॥ ८१ ॥
This verse is cited in T. panji. p. 569, II. 16-17 along with the verse ; नान्योऽस्ति. . . . 1-v. n. 114.

138. *Samagri*. according to early Buddhist includes three factors : (1) *visaya* (2) *indriya*, and (3) *vijn̄ana, manas* and it gives rise to a sensation, *sparsa*, which is followed by feeling, *vedana*, and then image, *samjna*, v. Bud. logic. II, p. 311, Table, *Cp. Kosa*, III, p. 63, 23.

139. Here the term *saha* is in the sense of immediate sucession: *cfr. the next verse*,

140. पूर्वपरं यदा ज्ञानमिन्द्रियश्च प्रवर्तते ।
तत्साहश्येन तत्त्वाम नार्थतः सहवेदनम् ॥ ८२ ॥

141. वेद्यत्वादेव विज्ञानान्योऽर्थो, ग्राह्यभागकम् ।
ज्ञानं सिध्यति यो वादस्तत्र हेतोरनिश्चयः ॥ ८३ ॥

142. That is, the reason is doubtful, (v. ver. 74 above.) *Sandigdha-asiddha*.

143. ज्ञानवित्तेः स्वभावत्वात् वेद्यते चेति कथ्यते ।
विषयाभासिविज्ञानजनकत्वश्च वेदनम् ॥ ८४ ॥

144. The idea is made clear in T. Panji, p. 570, I, 18. *ff.*
नहि मुख्यतो यादृशं ज्ञानस्यात्मसंवेदनं ताहशमेवार्थस्येष्टम् ।
किं तर्हि । स्वाभासज्ञानजनकत्वमेवास्य संवेद्यत्वम् । The author probably means this *mukhyato vedyatva* by the expression *jnana-vitteh svabhavatvat*. It does not however follow from it that the author means that the knowledge knows itself. According to the Vaibhasika knowledge knows its preceding moment and hence there is no *jnana-sva-vitti*.

145. संवेद्यशब्दसाम्येऽपि तदर्थः पृथगेव हि ।
गवादीनां यथा गोत्वात्तथाकारो न सिध्यति a ॥ ८५ ॥
a lit. असिद्धः

145a. The idea of this verse is also referred to in T. Panji. p. 570. I. 20, *ff.*

ततश्च यदि मुख्यं संवेदनं हेतुत्वेनोपादीयते । तदा हेतोरसिद्धता । अथापि यथाकथश्चित् संवेदनशब्दवाच्यतासाम्यात् । तथापि न तथाविधादिष्टसिद्धिः । नहि गोशब्दसाम्यात् गवयादीनां विषाणित्वसिद्धिः । *Mukhya samvedana* above referred to is also implied in the following passage: यदेवात्मसंवेदनं ज्ञानस्य तदेवार्थस्येति परेणापि बाह्यर्थवादिनाऽङ्गीकृतम् । (T. Panji. p. 568, l. 12) The *Bahyarthavadin* of this passage is probably, the *Vaibhasika* (?)

146. सर्वज्ञानसंवेदसन्तानान्तरभाविताः ।
धर्मा येऽनैकान्तिकास्तैः सर्वं त्रोऽबोधकः कथम् ॥ ८६ ॥

146a. This defect of *anaikantika* is explained in T. Panji. v. note on ver. 68.

146b. *cp.* T. Panji. p. 573, l. 15 *ff.* making this same prasanga in a different context.

147. साकारज्ञानपक्षे च तत्त्विभासस्य वेद्यता ।
तस्याभेदे च संसाध्ये सिद्धसाधनता भवेत् ॥ ८७ ॥

This verse is cited in T. Panji p. 570, l. 20-4 with this introductory remark: अथ ज्ञानारूढं नीलाद्याकारं धर्मिणमाश्रित्य साकारज्ञानपक्षे विविधोऽपि हेतुरभिप्रेतः । तदा सिद्धसाधनता । यथोक्तम्—। The *Sakara-Jnana-vadin* is the *Sautrantika*.

148. रूपसाम्यकरोऽर्थस्तु a फलात्संवेद्यसम्मतः ।
भावस्य तस्यावेद्यत्वात् अभेदो न भविष्यति ॥ ८८ ॥

a=उपचारात्, Its *samvedana* is *gauna*. The idea is well explained in the passage quoted in note 145. This is the standpoint of the *Sautrantika* also. He is therefore called *Bahyarthanumana-vadin* v. my paper: *Bud. Idealism.* ob. cit. p. 78; *Tsan.* p. 402, ver. प्रतिविम्बस्य तादूप्याङ्गाक्तं स्यादपि वेदनम् ।

149. कथं तद्ग्राहकं तत्त्वेत् [206b] तत्परिच्छेदलक्षणम् ।
विज्ञानं तेन नाशङ्का कथं तत् कि वदिति ॥ ८९ ॥

T. Panji. (p. 561, l. 11 *f*) cites this verse with this remark: भदन्त- शुभगुप्तस्त्वाहः विज्ञानमनापन्न विषयाकारमपि विषयं प्रतिपद्यते । तत्परिच्छेद-रूपत्वात् । तस्मान्नाशङ्का कर्तव्या कथं परिच्छनन्ति । किंवत् परिच्छनन्तीति । आह च—1 Definition of *pariccheda*, v. ver. 92. below.—

150. विज्ञानरूपमन्येन व्यवस्थाप्य समो a हृते ।
कथं वाच्यं तदर्थस्य संपरिच्छेदकन्तिति ॥ ९० ॥

a=समारोप्यते ।

151. This is probably the author's criticism of the *sarupya* theory of the Sautrantika-Yogacaras.

152. अर्थपरिच्छित्तिमावश्व विज्ञानमिष्यते यदा ।
कथं स्वविषयं ज्ञानं वेत्तीत्युक्तिरसङ्घटा ॥ ९१ ॥

153.

154. विज्ञानं तत्काराकं न निष्क्रियं परमार्थतः ।
वित्तिमात्रे कारकत्वं समारोप्य हि कथ्यते ॥ ९२ ॥

155. Thus the above stated *pariccheda* of the ver. 89 is simply *vittimatra*.

156. अनासङ्गेन दर्शी च विद्वान् संविशते यथा ।
किञ्चिद्दर्शी तथा ज्ञा a नह्यादौ विशते पुनः ॥ ९३ ॥
a=ses. pa. gzugs=knowledge-form,

157. सर्वज्ञस्य तदन्येषां न भेदो ज्ञानमात्रतः ।
सर्वाकारधिया सर्वे महात्मानो विशेषिता ॥ ९४ ॥

158. This is very important to note that the author denies an apparent distinction between the Saint and the ordinary man in respect of their grasping the external things. The Saint has an additional virtue of penetrating into different aspects of things; *sarvakara-jnana* is one of the qualities attributed to the Buddha, v. kosa, IX. ver. 1.

159. साकारं वा निराकारं तुल्यकालमतुल्यजम् ।
इति बौद्धेऽपि विज्ञाने किनु चिन्ता^A प्रवर्तते ॥ ९५ ॥
cited in the T. Panji. p. 573, l. 7 with the explanation :
तथा साकारादिविज्ञानेन नार्थस्य ग्रहणं युक्तम् इति चिन्ता क्रियते । तथा भगवतोऽपि
नेनार्थस्य ग्रहणं प्रति किं न क्रियते ।
a Read bsam. pa for byis. pa.

160. *Sakara-vadin* is the Sautrantika, and *nirakara-vadin* Vaibhäsika. The Yogacara is *tulya-kala-vadin* and the Vaibhäsika and *Satyasiddhi* are *atulya-kala-vadin*=*Krama-vadin*. Similarly Vasubandhu, a follower of the Sautrantika school pleads for *atulya-kala-vedana*, a Successive comprehension even of omniscient Buddha thus :
सन्तानेन समर्थत्वात् यथाग्निः सर्वभुङ्मतः ।
तथा सर्वविदेष्यो न सकृत्सर्ववेदनात् ॥ Kosa. IX. 1.

161. आकारस्तव यस्तल सम्भवत्येव तद्वियः ।
आकारः स च रूपादौ पुनस्तल प्रकल्प्यते ॥ ९६ ॥

162. We experience different things in different shapes. some long, some short, some square and so on. These shapes according to the Vaibhasikas are external and real belonging to the coagulated atoms. The Sautrantika and Dignaga school on the other hand, hold that they are internal and unreal as they are merely our mind's construction.

163. त्यक्तावृत्तित्वात् युक्तिश्च ज्ञेये नेति न सङ्गतिः ।
कथं स ज्ञेयमारूढस्तत्सम *a* मतिदिश्यते ॥ ९७ ॥
a = lit. तन्मात्रसम ।

164. The Mahayanists think that the yogin, having removed the two kinds of obscuration, *klesa* and *jneya-avarana* would not have any idea of external things. The author redicules this point, *cp.* T. Panji. p. 574 ad. ver. 2048.

165. निरूपणात्मिका बुद्धिः सत्यथ वाच्यसत्याप ।
a अर्थस्तित्वेऽविसंवादः ,
a = lit. अर्थोऽस्ति यन्त्रविसंवादः ।

165a. The *avisaṃvāda* argument has already been stated in ver. 3. v. also ver. 185. Here we may note the passage cited in T. Panji. 574, II. 20, *ff*: अत्र भद्रन्तशुभगुप्तः प्रमाणयति-यो ज्ञानाकारः स संवादित्वे सति तथा विद्यापरपदार्थजनितः तद्यथा ग्राहक आकारः, ज्ञानाकारश्चायमविलुप्तेऽदियस्य नीलादिप्रतिभासविशेषः संवादीति स्वाभावहेतुः । This prose passage may be from his *lost commentary on the katikas*.

166. तिमिरादौ विनार्थकम् ॥ १८ ॥
प्रेक्षितस्त्र्य यथा रूपं *a* नीलानुभव इत्यपि ।
आरोप्य कथ्यते बुद्धावाकारः कोऽपि नास्ति च ॥ ९९ ॥
a = नीलाकारानुभवः ।

167. अस्ति नास्तीति कल्पोऽपि विज्ञानं कल्पनात्मकम् ।
अर्थप्रेक्षाविशेषेण विज्ञानं भिन्नमुच्यते ॥ १०० ॥

168. The author probably means to say what constitutes distinction of one knowledge from another in his theory of imageless knowledge.

169. यथा हि भवतां जानं निराकारश्च तत्त्वतः ।
 वेत्ति चाभूतमाकारं भूतमर्थं तथैव नः ॥ १०१ ॥
 This verse is cited in T. san. p. 572.

170. For the Yogacara the true knowledge is non-dual, *advaya* as stated in the next verse and imageless, *cfr.* T. Panji. p. 182 : तदेतदस्माकमपि निराकारविज्ञानवादिनां बौद्धानामुत्तरं भगिष्यति The images are imputed by *anadi-vasana* or *saktis* formed out of knowledges produced by the sensuous object for the Sautrantika. v. ver. 27. above.

171. आत्मा *a*ज्ञानस्य नास्त्यस्य विरोधादद्वयात्मनः ।
 अभूतं वेद्यते नव प्रसज्येता भ्रान्तमेव तत् ॥ १०२ ॥
 a = In the sense of a separate image, *prthak akara*.

172. *a*यथापरीक्षितं भ्रान्त्या व्यवस्थेयं कृतेति चेत् ।
 [207a] भ्रान्ताकारोऽवसेयश्च कथं स्यात् कल्पितो न चेत् ॥ १०३ ॥
 a or वित्कितम् ।

173. This is exactly what the Yogacara says ; this is accepted by the author himself, note वेत्ति चाभूतमाकारम् in the ver. 101. The author, has, however, stated it as *kalpita* by way of *prasanga*.

174. भूतस्तेन विज्ञानं निराकारश्च *a*चक्षुषा ।
 भौतिकेन परिच्छन्द्यात् रात्राऽसद्वापि योग्यकम् ॥ १०४ ॥
 a = lit. चक्षुरादिना ।

175. This is the basic conclusion of the author. The sense-organs, for the Vaibhasika, are derivative material elements ; but, for the Yogacara they are some forms of *Sakti*. v. Alambanap. ver. 7. with Vinitadeva's tika. *cp.* Satyasiddhi, chap, 45. they are nominal. *Pariccheda* is explained in ver. 89-92 above, *Yogya*=an object that falls within the range of senses and not a remote one.

176. प्रदीपः स्वपरात्मानौ सम्प्रकाशयते यथा ।
 विज्ञानं द्विविधालम्बस्वरूपश्च तथा यदि ॥ १०५ ॥
 विरोधः कोऽपि नैवास्ति ।
 This verse is made of 5 lines in order to complete the sense.

177. The lamp-example is cited by the Sautrantika-Yogacaras in favour of their theory of *svasamvedana* which is criticised in Mad. karika, VII, 8 and Madh. avatara, my Sanskrit text,

p. 60: अत कश्चित् सौतान्तिकपक्षमभ्युपगम्य । It seems that the early Sautrantika, i.e. Darstantika does not accept the theory of *svasamvedana*, cfr, Kosa, IX, p. 231, n. 4 ; Vyakhyā, p. 698, 2-3; Satya-Siddhi, chap. 68,71,72. The Vaibhasika maintains that one knowledge cognizes its preceding one, (cfr. ver. 84. n. 144, cp, ver. 90, 144 and 147. also) In case of not accepting *svasamvedana*, how the memory is possible is explained in Bodhi-avatara IX ver. 246, my Epitom. p. 39, ALB. 1953.

178. This implies that the simultaneous grasping two and more colours, e.g. is possible. Therefore the cognition of several colours in the case of *citrastarana* is quite permissible, v. T. Panji. p. 571: ये तु मन्यन्ते समानजातीयान्याकारसंख्यान्येव बहूनि चिलास्तरणादिषु युगपत्सम्भवन्त्येव विजातीयरूपशब्दादिज्ञानवदिति । ततश्च प्रसङ्गे सिद्धसाध्यतेर्ति । तेषां चिलास्तरणे नीलादयो बहव आकाराः संवेद्यन्ते, परमेकाकारेऽपि सितादावर्वाग्मध्यपरभागरूपा बहव आकारा इति तदात्मकं तलापि ज्ञानमनेकात्मकं प्राप्नोति । इध्यत एव ति चेत्। Kamalasila probably means some Sautrantika author who pleads that several images are simultaneously experienced in the case of *citrastarana*. But Subhagupta may not agree with this opinion, as a sensuous knowledge, according to him can comprehend several homogeneous objects at once.

179. रूपशब्दादयोऽर्थात् विभिन्नेन्द्रियगोचराः ।
तेन ते ह्येककाः सन्त्यनुभाव्या न च

180. cp. M. I, 295; S. V, 218, cited in kosa IX, 242 ; Satyasiddhi, chap. 35. The different kinds of objects, such as colour, sound, etc. cannot be simultaneously cognized by their respective sense-organ-says the Vaibhasika. The Yogacara on the other hand, thinks that simultaneity of different nonconstructive consciousnesses is possible as T. san, says ;

नर्तकीदृष्ट्यवस्थादावखिलं वेद्यते सङ्कृत् ।
शुद्धे च मानसे कल्पे व्यवसीयेत् न क्रमः ।

अतः सर्वत विषये न क्रमग्रहणं भवेत् ।
सङ्कृदग्रहणमासस्तु भवेच्छब्दादिबोधवत् । (1250-53)

The same in Pram. var. III, 136-37.

सङ्कृतसङ्गतसवर्थेऽविन्द्रियेऽविह सत्त्वपि ।

.....तस्मात् सन्तु सङ्कृत विद्यः ॥

cp. Ibid. 208: नानार्थिका भवेत् तस्मात् सिद्धाऽतिविकल्पिका ।

विकल्पयन्नव्येकार्थं यतोऽन्यदपि पश्यति ॥

Prajnakara's Bhasya: चित्रप्रतिभासो हि नानानीलादिरूपणे । नीलमिदमिति

विकल्पयत्रपि पर्यन्तवर्तिपीतादिकं पश्यत्येव । न च युगपदनेकविकल्पसम्भवः । p.286.
The last sentence makes clear that the Yogacara bans the simultaneity of different constructive thoughts. *cp.* again T. san: अनिष्टेश द्वयोः सकृत । Panji. p. 241: नह्येकस्मिन् काले युगपदभिलापद्वयं संवर्दयते । See also note 71 above.

181. अत तु ॥ १०६ ॥
विभिन्नकारणमृते ज्ञानमालम्भल a क्षणम् ।
a=*dmigs*, pa.

182. यत उत्पद्यते याद्यक् ज्ञानं यत् तदनन्तरम् ॥ १०७ ॥
विषयस्तुल्यावप्यमित्ये [वं] भ्रान्तितो वचः ।
तत् नित्यं विद्यते न, विषयाभासतो यतः ॥ १०८ ॥
समस्ववेदनाभावात् ;

183. Here and onwards the author criticises the opinion of some Sautrantika masters who hold that our consciousness while grasping an external thing, moulds itself into an image similar to that of the external thing and that this moulding is effected in just immediately next moment after the external thing falls within the ken of the sense-organ. According to Dharmakirti a non-constructive mental perception intervenes in the second moment and the synthetic cognition (*savikalpa*) is effected with the image-formation in the third moment (v. Bud. logic. II, p. 312, the Table) our author here, without taking notice of the second stage mental perception speaks of the image-invested knowledge as immediately following the first moment's pure sensation.

184. ज्ञानाकारः समानकः ।
सवचित्तेषु भवति भूते च वं विशेषतः ॥ १०६ ॥
न वाच्यं वप्यस्तुल्यम् [इति]

185. Jnanakara, for this author, is *grahakakara*, *cfr.* n. 165a.

186. अस्मिन् ग्राहचावभासके ।
नानन्तरं ज्ञानं भावि विषयेण तु साम्यतः ॥ ११० ॥

187. *cp.* T. San. ver. 2039. सर्वात्मना च सारूप्ये ज्ञानमज्ञानतां ब्रजेत् ।

188. नीलादिमालाभासे च ज्ञानं नीलादिभासकम् ।
तदनन्तरमास्ते चेत् तदा तद्विषयं हि तत् ॥ १११ ॥
तदा तत्त्वार्थसदृशम् अस्ति सत्यं न तुल्यकम् ।

189. अनित्यदुःखादि यथा तथागतेन [दिशितम्] ॥ ११२ ॥
 ग्राह्यावभासकं नैतत्; आलम्बनायागतो बहिः
 ग्राह्यभागोऽथ *a*इष्टचेत् न युक्त तस्य लक्षणम् ॥ ११३ ॥
a = lit. विषय ।

190. Causality and objectivity are two characteristics of the content.

191. कुतो बुद्धि *a*निर्विकल्पा स चित्तस्याभास एव च ।
 तत्त्वावभासबुद्धिर्न विषयस्यापृथक्त्वतः ॥ ११४ ॥
a = lit. बुद्धेः

192. The kind of *nirvikalpa* mind that is pleaded by the Sautrantika-Yogacara school is not accepted by the author. The Vaibhasika conception of *nirvikalpa* is explained in *kosa*. I. ver. 33. with Poussin's note.

193. जनकस्य च नास्तित्वे कथं नाम तदिष्यते ।

194.

195. ब्राह्मणवश्च सङ्घाता एकाङ्गविकल्पत्वतः ॥ ११५ ॥
 नालम्बनं स्युः, केनव हयुभयाभाव इष्यते ।

196. This argument is set up by Dignaga, v. Alambanap, ver. 1-3.

197. ग्राहकाकारकं ज्ञानं लक्षणद्वयवर्जितम् ॥ ११६ ॥
 यथा हयालम्बनं नास्ति ग्राह्याकारोऽपि नेष्यते ।

198. पूर्वकं सदृशं ज्ञानं आलम्बनं यदीष्यते ॥ ११७ ॥
 तदप्ययुक्तं ज्ञाने नानन्तरं ज्ञानं भाति च ।

199. Here 'similar' is with reference to the objective element. The idea seems to be this: the knowledge first becomes similar to its object and this similaized knowledge becomes the object of its immediately following knowledge. The author objects to this because no knowledge flashes up immediately after its predecessor. In Tib. or after *sna-ma* stands for objective case governed by the verb *hdod, pa*.

200. *a* आहत्य शब्दं विज्ञानं रूपाकारं भवेद्वदि ॥ ११८ ॥
 तेन त्वालम्बनेनैव ज्ञानम् सदृशं कथम् ।
a—Tib. *mjug. thogs. su.*

201. The author's objection appears to be this: Suppose in the first moment there is a knowledge of the Sound and in the next

moment a knowledge of rupa arises in its continuity. This second knowledge must bear the image of the sound according to your *Sarupya* theory. Therefor it is not well founded.

202. केचिदाहुस्तुल्यज्ञानकृ aक्षक्तिः b विषयस्थितिः ॥ ११६ ॥

तस्याप्ययोगात् शक्तिस्तु न भावीन्द्रियचेतसि ।

a = lit. जनक. b. lit. आलम्बन ।

203. See T. San. ver. 2083: शक्तावनन्तरे ज्ञाने ग्राह्यांशे विषयस्थितिः ।

Panji. शक्तावनन्तरे ज्ञान इति व्यधिकरणसप्तम्यो । अनन्तरे ज्ञान इति समनन्तरप्रत्यय आल्याख्ये या शक्तिः तथाविधार्थप्रतिभासप्रत्ययसमर्थिता ।

Sakti may be considered *alambana* as it arouses the knowledge. v. note 40. *Sakti—alambana* theory has also been referred to by Vinitadeva in his *Tika Alambanap.* ver. 8. v. my forthcoming edn.

204. ग्राह्ये विषयतव नियमात् विषयस्थितिः ॥ १२० ॥

लोक्तोऽर्थसंसिद्धेः अस्ति लक्षणमनुकक्षम् ।

205. aज्ञानशक्ति लौकिकी चेत् नार्थत्वेन तु नाश्रिता ॥ १२१ ॥

लक्षणस्याप्यसत्वे च सालम्बनं कर्थं भवेत् ।

a=Tib. ज्ञानं शक्तिश्र ।

206. The Characteristics as stated before (note 190) are causality and objectivity. Sakti may fulfil the first but not the second.

207. लोकनीत्यागमं प्रेत्य बाह्यालम्बनतं च हि ॥ १२२ ॥

परीक्षता युज्यते च न ज्ञेयं सर्वथास्ति तु ।

208. This is the fundamental doctrine of the author, Vaibhasika.

209 इष्टानिष्टदिल्पश्च भूततो बाह्यमस्ति न ॥ १२३ ॥

चित्तमालमिदमिति असम्बद्धमिदं [वचः] ।

210. The opponent thinks that there cannot be any thing in the external like desirable or undesirable; for, what is desirable for one person is undesirable for another, v. *Bhavasantiika*, p. 39.

211. दुःखादिरूपे कस्मिंश्चित् गुणादि aभावनावतः ॥ १२४ ॥

हेतुभेदात् फलमप्यनुग्रहविशेषितम् ।

a = lit. भावनाहेतु—The case-ending is not in Tib.

212. The idea here and in the following seems to be this: The Yogacara thinks that the yogin can change any thing into another form by dint of his deep meditative power or *adhimukti*, cp. Madh. Avatara, VI, 69. गुरुपदेशात् किल योगिना हि कञ्चालपूणावनिदर्शनं यत् ।

213. अर्थे । वनीलनिर्भासि ज्ञानं तत्समनन्तरम् ॥ १२५ ॥

अभ्यासाददुःखरूपादि तथान्यदन्यतो भवेत् ।

214. प्रीतिव्यसनमिद्धानामभ्यासातिशयात् भिदा a ॥ १२६ ॥

अथर्कारात् नैवेति मतञ्चेत् तत् पुनः कथम् ।
a = Tib. *bye-brag-dbye*.

215. आरोपाद् दूष्यते तेन ह्यनालम्बनवस्तुता ॥ १२७ ॥

कथं पुनर्नोपपन्ना, सिद्धिरर्थक्रियादशा ।
तदभावे च तन्नास्ति ;

216. अर्थान् स्वप्नोपघातवत् ॥ १२८ ॥

विना क्रिया सम्मताऽप्रक्रियासत्त्वादतः पुनः ।
बाह्याभावो यदीष्येत वयं कारित्वमालतः ॥ १२९ ॥

बाह्यर्थसिद्धिं न ब्रूमो a मिथ्याज्ञानस्वभावतः ।
करित्वसिद्धेष्टव्यष्टिवात् ; a = Tib. *log-par-ses-pa*.

217. *Svapnopaghatavat*, v. note 221 below. The Sautrantika-Yogacara's definition of reality is: अर्थक्रियासमर्थलक्षणं वस्तु । Nyayabindu, I, 15 ; T. Panji. p. 730, l. 16 : सौनान्तिकनयेन यदर्थक्रियाकारि तदेव परमार्थसत् तदन्यत्तु संवृतिसत्।

218. अर्थवाप्तेरथापि च ॥ १३० ॥

हिताहितक्रिया काये तद्विहीनेऽपि विभ्रमे ।
क्रियामानस्य सत्त्वेन ;

219. This is already pointed out in the previous verse.

220 [208a] स्वप्ने कामस्य चेष्टितम् ॥ १३१ ॥

तस्योदयस्तु नियतो नाशुच्युतपत्तिमालके ।
कुतः कामार्थलाभः स्यात् ,

221. This is given as example to disprove externalism by Vasu-bandhu in his Vimsa. ver. 3 a : स्वप्नोपघातवत् कृत्यक्रिया । Bhasya: सिद्धेति वेदितव्यम् । यथा स्वप्ने द्वयसमापत्तिमन्तरेण शुक्रविसर्गलक्षणः स्वप्नोपघातः ।

222. सावधात् शुक्रागयोः ॥ १३२ ॥
 अन्यत जायते स्वप्नात् संस्पर्शे कामत स्त्रियः ।
 यथा त्वेवाविसवादः ;

223. कामिन्या दर्शने यदि ॥ १३३ ॥
 कामाश्रयाच्च सम्भूतं, कस्मान्न स्वप्नघातवत् ।
 नखदन्तस्वादीनि;

224. विहायापि च योषितम् ॥ १३४ ॥
 तं समाश्रित्य सम्भुते कस्मान्न स्वप्नघातवत् ।
 नखदन्तरत्रवादीनि;

225. रागात् शुक्रस्य सम्भवे ॥ १३५ ॥
 बुद्धेर्थः कृत इति तत् पुनर्न च शोभते ।

226. Blo yi-don = *buddher arthah* probably is the same as *kamartha* previously stated in the ver. 132, note, 220, i.e. *purusartha* purpose of human action.

227. क्रियामात्रं यथा नोक्तं पुत्रलाभादयश्च ये ॥ १३६ ॥
 सत्यतः स्वप्ने दृश्यन्ते विसंवदन्ति दृष्टकम् ।

228. The definition of action is: चेतना कर्म वदामि चेतयित्वा च corresponding to pali A. III. 415. Ref. Kathavatthu, p. 393. Madh. kar. XVIII, 2-3, Madh. Av, VI, ver, 89. cited in Bodh. Panji. p. 472-Poussin, kosa. IV, n. 3. since there is no *cetana*, will in dream, there is no real action.

229. प्रोक्तकर्तृक्रियाजाताः सन्तो aनरकपादयः ॥ १३७ ॥
 अतो विज्ञिमाल b त्वे न काष्यर्थक्रिया स्ति च ।
 चित्तमालमतोऽसिद्धम् ;
 a = lit. तथा नरकपालादयः सन्ति ।
 b = lit. विज्ञप्त्याकारमालां

230. The author refutes the Vimsa, ver. 4. नरकवत् पुनः ।
 सर्वं नरकपालादि दर्शने तैश्च बाधने ।
 Bhasya : यथा नरकेषु नारकाणां नरकपालादिदर्शनं देशकाल-
 नियमेन सिद्धम्, श्वायसायसपर्वताद्यागमनगमनदर्शनञ्चे-
 त्यादिग्रहणेन भवेषाच्च नैकस्यैव तैश्च तद्वाधर्तं सिद्धमसत्वाप
 नरकपालादिषु समानस्वकर्मविपाकविपत्यात् ।

231. नानाकायावभासने ॥ १३८ ॥
 सन्तानान्तरसंसिध्दौ नरकञ्च तथास्ति तु ।
 परसत्त्वः कुतो नास्ति,

232. Vasubandhu and other Yogacaras deny the existence of other living beings *cp.* Ratnakirti's *Santanantara-dusana*, K. P. T. Institute, 1959. Dharmakirti however, does reverse it in his *Santanantara-Siddhi*, *v.* Bud. logic I, *P.* 521, *P.* 521 ff.

233. तथा निभृतमण्डलात् ॥ १३९ ॥
 चद्गीर्णविषनष्टस्य देवोऽसुग्रहकारकः ।
 स्वसत्यवचने तिष्ठत् ।

234. Reference is probably a Garuda-mantra promising the boon.

235. पूर्वतःनं विना यतः ॥ १४० ॥
 अर्थक्रिया न शक्येत ततश्चित्कृता न सा ।

236. *Purvatantra*, rituals containing the Buddhist Tantric rites described in Tantric literature as to how one may ward off the influence of the evil spirits and gain earthly prosperity. Here reviving the dead person cannot be accomplished without the assistance of such rituals.

237. परचित्तविदो ज्ञानमयथार्थं कथं भवेत् ॥ १४१ ॥

238. Vasubandhu contends that *para-citta-jnana* is untrue, *v.* Vimsa. ver. 20, but is true for the author, *v.* ver. 148. below.

239. यदान्यचित्ते सत्येव ज्ञानं निविशते हि तत् ।
 सत्यथ [वा] तदाकारं विज्ञानं ग्राहकं मतम् ॥ १४२ ॥

240. This is said from the standpoint of the Sautrantika-Yogacaras.

241. स्वविषयान्तिकप्राप्त्या व्यापारवत् ग्रहो न च ।
 अयदनन्तरमुप्साद्यम् ;
 a = Tib. gan-gi-mjug-pa-thogs-su-hbyun, *cp.* ver. 173.

242. The author probably refers to the Naiyayika's theory of *rasmi* moving towards the object much criticised in the *Satya-siddhi*, Chap. 49-50 what is termed व्यापार (*vyapara*) for Dignaga, *Pram-sam* I, 9, T. Panji. p. 399:

243. तथा ज्ञानं स्वचेतसः ॥ १४३ ॥
 लक्षणेन यथोक्तेन ग्राहकं चित्तमस्ति तत् ।

244. *Sva-citta-jnana*, knowing one's own mind is possible in the same manner as *paracitta-jnana* is. This is not, however,

sva-samvedana, self-knowledge of the Yogacaras, but simply one mind knowing the other mind.

245. अतीतचित्तं । स्मरणं यद्भूतगतमस्ति च ॥ १४४ ॥
तस्य हेतोश्च चित्तस्यातुपत्ते न तु ग्रहः ।

246. Memory is not a perceptual cognition (*grahu*), v. Pram. Sam. I, 8. Read Bodhi. Panji. p. 401-2 explaining it without accepting *sva-samvedana*, cp. Satyasiddhi chap. 91, same explanation of memory.

247. सम्बुद्धगोचरादृतरूपस्याज्ञानतः पुनः ॥ १४५ ॥
अय थार्था यदुक्तं तदद्यत्वान्न शोभनम् ।
a = Tib. *don-bsin-min*. The same expression in Vimsa.
Tib. version.

248. cp. Vimsa. p. 10: यथा । स्वचित्तज्ञानम् । तदपि कथम यथार्थम् ।
अज्ञानाद्यथा बुद्धस्यगोचरः ॥ २१ ॥ यथा तन्निरभिलाप्येनात्मना बुद्धानां गोचरः । तथा
तदज्ञानात् । तदुभयं न यथार्थं वित्तथप्रतिभासतवा ग्राह्यग्राहकविकल्पस्याप्रहीणत्वात् ।

249. ज्ञानेन ग्राहकेणव गृह्णन् ग्राह्यमशेषकम् ॥ १४६ ॥
सर्वज्ञः प्रोच्यते न त्वेवाद्याकारवेदनात् ।

250. This is the Vaibhasika's conception of *Sarvajna*.

251. अनिर्देश्यब्रह्मस्तु वेद्यते यत् पुनर्वचः ॥ १४७ ॥
अन्यस्य वेद्यं यत् तत् निर्देष्टु किमु शक्यते ।
अन्यचित्तपरिज्ञानात्,

252. Dignaga's theory of *anirdeśya* in Pram. Sam. I. 5:
स्वसंवेद्यमनिर्देशं रूपमिन्द्रियगोचरः ।

253. तस्मादालम्बसत्वतः ॥ १४८ ॥
निरालम्बं सर्वचित्तं नास्ति, तत् यदि कुबचित् ।
न बहिर्बिद्यते ग्राह्यं, सर्वज्ञश्च कथं पुनः ॥ १४९ ॥

254. In the absence of an object nothing could be regarded as cognizer of it v. n. 249-50.

255. स्वचित्तमात्रविज्ञानात् स्वसंवेदनमेव च ।
स्वचित्तमात्रविज्ञानात् सर्वज्ञश्च प्रकल्पितः ॥ १५० ॥-
ज्ञायते चेत् पृथक कश्चित् न स्यात् धीमात्रदर्शनम् ।

256. अद्वयज्ञानमात्रत्वे न दोष इतिचेन्मतम् ॥ १५१ ॥
कथं तथापि विज्ञानं विषयस्थोपलम्भकम् ।

257. ज्ञाने द्वयविमुक्ते च सर्वाकारप्रवेदनम् a ॥ १५२ ॥
 इति विम्मयमेवेदं ; ततोऽस्ति ग्राहकात्मकः ।
 सर्वज्ञ उपलब्धोऽन्यः
 a = lit. संवेदनम्

258. आस्ते नैवेति कश्चन ।
 प्राज्ञैः मन्यस्य प्राज्ञानां स्वदुर्मतेश्च a खेदितम् ॥ १५३ ॥
 a = Tib. der. sdugs. so.

259. This probably refers to Kumarila's objection.

260. प्रत्यक्षहेतोनियतं a प्रतापभावनोऽद्भवात् ।
 रागादिदोषसामग्रा नितान्तं b परिहीयते ॥ १५४ ॥
 a = lit. किञ्चित्प्रतिपक्षभावनासंभवात् ।
 b = lit. नितान्तपरिक्षयः सम्भवति ।

261. सर्वं वै बालचित्तश्च द्वयाकारकमित्यतः ।
 किञ्चिद्भावनया क्षये a न प्रतीपक्षस ज्ञति bः ॥ १५५ ॥
 a = परिक्षये b = अवसरः

262. शून्यमित्येव यत् ज्ञान मुक्ताकारवगतं पुनः ।
 आकारद्वयसंयुक्तं प्रतिपक्षश्च तत् कथम् ॥ १५६ ॥
 a = lit. प्रविष्टम् ।

263. This probably refers to the Sunyata-meditation as interpreted by the Yogacara.

264. कामरागं भावयतो रागक्षयो न च ।
 द्वयरूपं भावयतः स्यादक्षीणं द्वयं तथा ॥ १५७ ॥

265. बुद्धो भावांशमारोप्य [209a] नैरात्म्यकादिभावना ।
 अद्वये शब्दमाले चानर्था तद्भावना नहि ॥ १५८ ॥

266. It is interesting to note that the author's statement to the effect that our idea of one entity (bhava) in as assumption on the discrete atoms.

267. नित्योपलब्धसंक्ले श a मतिक्रामत्यनित्यता ।
 सर्वोपलब्धिनास्तित्वात् बुद्धत्वास्तिरवश्यकी ॥ १५९ ॥
 a = add. आशु ।

268. सर्वोपलब्धिरहितः सर्वथापि च निष्क्रियः ।
 व्यवसायश्च चर्याश्च विना बुद्धत्वमिष्यते ॥ १६० ॥

269. It is historically true that the Buddha obtained his enlightenment as a result of long practices and effort. That enlightenment can not be obtained very easily and in a moment by the Yogacara.

270. अतः सत्त्वेषु करुणा तद्वितोपायतः पुनः ।
संस्कृतानित्यचिन्तातः सौगतं पदमिष्यते ॥ १६१ ॥

271. The author has summed up here how Buddhahood should be secured in the system of the Vaibhasikas.

272. कथं धीशब्दमालत्वे दानादिपरिपूरणम् ।
देयं न विद्यते तस्मात् बुद्धत्वम् न सम्भवेत् ॥ १६२ ॥

273. अन्योन्यप्रवशादेव विज्ञप्तिनियमेन च ।
दानादानाकारिका च बुद्धिरूपद्यते यदि ॥ १६३ ॥
तत्प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्यामासागमान्व सिद्ध्यति ।
तत्पुनः कल्पनामात् केवलं परिकीर्तनम् ॥ १६४ ॥

274. *cp. Vimsa. ver. 18:* अन्योन्याधिपतित्वेन विज्ञप्तिनियमो मिथः ।

275. दानाकृतिकविज्ञाने हृचम्यस्ते शतशोऽपिच ।
सत्त्वस्य कस्यचित् किन्तु न दारिद्र्यवियोजनम् ॥ १६५ ॥

276. अप्रमाणे मनस्कारे भावितेऽपि हि योगिनाम् ।
न दुःखसुखयोर्हीनिः रनुप्राप्तिश्चभूतः ॥ १६६ ॥

277. सर्वेषां सर्वदाने च कृपादानप्रपूरणे ।
अर्थात्मना न भेदोऽस्ति तलादाननिषेधनम् ॥ १६७ ॥

278. See. Bodhic. avat. V, 86 and Panji, citing the authority of the *Bodhisattva-pratimoksa*.

279. परिनिर्वाणमस्त्येव धातुश्च मृतकायिकः ।
दृष्टा गृहविहाराश्च कथं स्युः परतन्त्रकाः ॥ १६८ ॥

280. *cp. Trimsa. ver. 24.*

281. यदि स्वतन्त्रा न स्युस्ते हृतीतानुमितिः कथम् ।
नातीतज्ज्वेदनुमितं तत्तु स्यादतिलौकिकम् a ॥ १६९ ॥
a = lit. अतिलोकप्रकान्त = *sin-tu-hjig-rten-thal*.

282. श्रुतमुक्त्या विशुद्धस्य मूर्तिद्वृक् वीतरागकः ।
अनुमानं भवेत्तो चेत् श्रद्धा च कथमुद्भवेत् ॥ १७० ॥

283. Tib. nan-thos-grol pas-rnam-dag-gi...
Sravaka-moksa is the highest perfection attainable by any disciple of the Buddha.

284. यदि प्रबन्धतो; जीवः खण्डतः [209b] किल दृश्यते ।
 तत् पुनस्तदधीनञ्चेत् कथं स्यात् परिनिर्वृतिः ॥ १७१ ॥

285. A tentative interpretation.

286. व्यवस्थितं लोकनीत्या वीजादिभ्योऽङ्गुरादिकम् ।
 उद्देतीति चित्तमालवादे नास्ति तु युक्ता ॥ १७२ ॥

287. यज्ञानानन्तरं^a ज्ञानं नियतमुद्भवेद्यदि ।
 तत्स्य हेतोस्तत् कार्यं, नियमोऽपि न विद्यते ॥ १७३ ॥
 a = Ses-pa-gan-mjug-thogs-su. cp. ver. 143 above.

288. cp. T. Panji. p. 180 : यस्यैवानन्तरं यत् भवति तत् तस्य कारणमिष्यते ।

289. तथाऽन्याकारकं ज्ञानं विना धूममतिर्भवेत् ।
 बीजेन रहिते चित्ते ह्यङ्गुराभासिधी भवेत् ॥ १७४ ॥

290. This *prasanga* has been made, because the knowledge of smoke is not concommittant with the knowledge of fire : this will become clear from the just next verse.

291. अग्निधीवासितं चित्तं धूमधीकारणं यदि ।
 अनेकशक्तौ सत्यात् भेदबोधः कुतो भवेत् ॥ १७५ ॥

292. अनन्तराग्निधीहेतौ धूमचित्तस्य कारणे ।
 तदप्यचारुः धूमस्य चित्तेऽनियतऽग्निधीः ॥ १७६ ॥

293. प्रतिवन्धेऽप्रसिद्धे च कथमस्मादिदं भवेत् ।
 अमिश्रव्यवहारश्च कथं हेतौ प्रवर्तते ॥ १७७ ॥

294. अतः कल्पितमाश्रित्य चित्तमालं लिघातुकम् ।
 इति प्रभाषितं सर्वं न रूपादेरसभवात् ॥ १७८ ॥

295. The author, from here, attempts to offer his own interpretations of those passages which speak of *cittamatrata*.

296. यस्मिन् रागादयो जाताः अक्षीङ्गुत्य च कल्पितम् ।
 दोषोपशान्तये तस्मादर्थे^a नैरात्म्यदेशना ॥ १७९ ॥
 a = lit. विषये ।

296a. This is the author's explanation of *Dharma-nairatmya*, a Mahayanic idea of the external things. Thus, according to

him all the passages declaring *dharma-nairatmya* are to be understood in the manner indicated here.

297. अन्यतापि तथा प्रोक्तं यथा बालैविकल्पितः ।
बाह्यभावश्च नैवास्त इति; कस्मात् विशिष्यते ॥ १८० ॥

298. *cp. ver.* बाह्यो न विद्यते भावो यथा बालैविकल्पिते ।
वासनालुटितं चित्तमर्थामासं प्रवर्तते ॥
cited in T. Panji. p. 14 and Subh. sangraha.

299. अनन्तरोपदेशात्र कारकाभिनिवेशतः ।
कृत्यानात्र परिज्ञानं, तेनात्मापोह उच्यते ॥ १८१ ॥

300. *Pudgala-nairatmya* is also accepted by the Sarvasti-vadi-Vai-bhasikas. The author here puts forth the reason for accepting it.

301. तथोपदेशादन्यतः कल्पितश्च विकल्पितम् ।
व्याख्यातं धर्मतारूपं धर्मता तु स्वलक्षणम् ॥ १८२ ॥
भावमातः कल्पितन्तु [तस्य] भेदो विकल्पितम् ।
धर्मतायाः प्रभेदोऽयं भावेऽसति न युज्यते ॥ १८३ ॥

302. It is well-known that the Yogacara accepts three characteristics, (*laksana*), viz. *Parikalpita*, *paratantra* and *parinispalna*. Likewise this author enumerates three things, viz *kalpita*, *vikalpita* and *dharmata*, of which the last one is explained as *svalaksana* corresponding to *Parinispalna* of the Yogacara. *Kalpita*, a basic entity, i.e. a *bhavamatra* may correspond to *Paratantra* and *Vikalpita*, a false aspect imputed on may correspond to *parikalpita*. Thus according to this Vaibhasika author as in the case of the Yogacara, two things, *Kalpita* and *dharmata* are true whereas *vikalpita* like *parikalpita* of the Yogacara is untrue. That the *vikalpita* is untrue has already been pointed out in the note 297 above. It is entirely false in as much as fancied by worldlings. *cp. ver.* 40. विकल्पितश्च शब्दार्थो न भाती-द्वियचेतसि । *Dharmata*, is an everlastingly true as it is the same as *svalaksana*, an everlasting *svabhava*, (*svabhavah sarvada casti . . .*) *Kalpita* that is explained as *bhavamatra*, a basic entity probably implies atomic foundations on which the various things are fancied. Atoms are *kalpita*, i.e. inferred, *v. ver.* 64, (n. 111). why the separate atoms are not cognized is made clear by the author in the *ver.* 44 (n. 76), though the aggregate atoms are cognized in their *svalaksana*, *v. ver.* 37. (n. 62).

303. यदि रूपं शून्यमुक्तं रूपशब्दः कथन्त्वह ।
कल्पयित्वा देश्यते चेत् कतमत्कलमिष्यते ॥ १८४ ॥

304. This is said probably with reference to the Madhyamika standpoint.

305. नासंवादो यत्र [210a] भावी तेन सन् भाव एव सः ।
अभावादेव सवस्य aनो पल्लिवस्तु स्वप्नवत् ॥ १८५ ॥
a Tib. *dmigs-ma-yin*.

306. The author's repeated argument of reality of the external things is *avisaṃvada*, a non-contradicted experience, v. vers: 3, (n. 5) 19 (n. 31) and 98. (n. 165).

307. This refers to the Madhyamika's position. The sentence may also read thus: their experiences resemble the dream, and [therefore] are non-existent.

308. वाह्यार्थवादिनः प्राहुरेवं aचित्तैकवादिनम् ।
किं न्यायोऽयमुत नो वा विचारयन्तु पण्डिताः ॥ १८६ ॥
a = lit. चित्तमान ।

309. न्यायान्यायविचारे मेऽद्भुता बुधधीर्नहि ।
किन्त्वन्येरितसत्यानां बहुसंक्षिप्य देशनात् ॥ १८७ ॥

310. ज्ञानभासा मोहतमोध्वंसः aसाक्षात्कृतो बुधैः ।
अद्यचोर्ध्वश्च महतां मार्गे bमूढः प्रसीं cदँतु ॥ १८८ ॥
a. Tib. *mnon. mdzed. cin* = साक्षात्कृ—
b. Tib. *skye. ba glen* = मूढजनः ।
c. Tib. *द्वंश-प्रीणा* *dwang-sig.*

THE TIBETAN TEXT

ଆ । ପ୍ରିସ୍ତାଣ୍ତିକ ଶୁଣ୍ୟ ତେଜାମୁଦ୍ରି କେଣାମେହୁଦ ଶୁଣ୍ୟ
ଶୁଣ୍ୟାନ୍ତିକ ।

ଆ । ଶ୍ରୀଶର୍ମାଙ୍କଣ୍ଠ । ପ୍ରକଳ୍ପିତାଙ୍କରମା ।

ଓ । স্বাধীনের প্রস্তুত্যাপনের
ক্ষেত্রে প্রাপ্ত

॥ ୫୩ ॥ ଶାନ୍ତିମୁଖୀ ଦେବବିନାଶପଦବିମନାତତ୍ତତ୍ତ୍ଵପ୍ରକାଶକ୍ରମୀ ॥

95. | ཁୁମ' མ' སତ୍ସ' མମ' ཁୁମ' མିନ୍ | | ཁୁମ' མ' མି' མତ୍ୱମ' མନ' མୁନ' མିନ୍ | |
 | མନ' མୁନ' མପ୍ରମ' མଦ' ཁୁମ' མି' མୁନ' | | ཁୁମ' མ' མନ' མୁ' མହୁ' མି' ཁୁଦ' | |

96. | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | མି' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |
 | ཁୁମ' མନ' མହୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |

97. | མୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | མି' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |
 | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |

98. | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |
 | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |

99. | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | མୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |
 | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |

100. | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |
 | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |

101. | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |
 | མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |

102. | མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |
 | མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |

103. | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |
 | (207^a) མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |

104. | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | ཁୁ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |
 | མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | | མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' མ' | |

105. | ଶାଖ·ଟି·ଶର·ମୀ·ଶରନ·ନ୍ଦ·ଶାଖା | ଶି·ଭୁବ·ଶ୍ଵର·ଶର·ପ୍ରିଦ·ଶା·ଭୁବ |
 | ନ୍ଦ·ଶରିନ·କମ·ଶା·ଶରିନ·ପ୍ରିଦ·ଶର | | ନ୍ଦିନୀ ଶାଶ·ଶାଶିନ·ପ୍ରିଦ·ଶର·ଶା |
 | ନ୍ଦିନୀ·ପ୍ରିଦ·ଶରନ·ଶାଶିନ·ପ୍ରିଦ·ଶର | |

106. | ଶାହିନାଶ·ଶ୍ଵର·ଶରିନ·ଶରନ·ଶାଶିନ | | ନ୍ଦିନୀ·ଶର·ନ୍ଦ·ଶ୍ଵର·ଶର |
 | ନ୍ଦିନୀ·ଶରନ·ଶାଶିନ·ଶରନ | | ନ୍ଦିନୀ·ଶର·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | |

107. | ଶାହିନାଶ·ଶ୍ଵର·ଶରିନ·ଶରନ | | ଶରିନ·ଶରିନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ |
 | ଶରନ·ଶ୍ଵର·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | | ନ୍ଦିନୀ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | |

108. | ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | | ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ |
 | ନ୍ଦିନୀ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | | ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | |

109. | ନ୍ଦିନୀ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | | ଶରିନ·ଶରିନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ |
 | ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | | ନ୍ଦିନୀ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | |

110. | ନ୍ଦିନୀ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | | ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ |
 | ନ୍ଦିନୀ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | | ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | |

111. | ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | | ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ |
 | ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | | ନ୍ଦିନୀ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | |

112. | ନ୍ଦିନୀ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | | ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ |
 | ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | | ନ୍ଦିନୀ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | |

113. | ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | | ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ |
 | ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | | ନ୍ଦିନୀ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ·ଶରନ | |

114.	। ཁྱු- ཆ- གྲු- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ-	। ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ-
115.	। ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ-	। ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ-
116.	। ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ-	। ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- ཁ-
117.	। ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ- ཁ-	। ཁ- ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ- ཁ-
118.	। ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ-	। ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ-
119.	। ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ-	। ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ-
120.	। ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ-	। ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ-
121.	। ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ-	। ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ-
122.	। ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ-	। ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ-
123.	। ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ-	। ཁ- ཁ- । ཁ- ཁ-

134. | ཨନ୍ତର୍ମାତ୍ରରେ ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ ପିଲା
| କିମ୍ବା ପ୍ରିଯାଙ୍କରେ ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ ।

135. | କିମ୍ବା ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା
| କିମ୍ବା ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା ।

136. | କିମ୍ବା ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା
| କିମ୍ବା ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା ।

137. | କିମ୍ବା ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା
| ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା ।

138. | ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା
| ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା ।

139. | ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା
| ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା ।

140. | ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା
| ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା ।

141. | ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା
| ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା ।

142. | ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା
| ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା ।

143. | ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା
| ପରିପ୍ରକାଶ ହୁଏ କିମ୍ବା ।

TIBETAN TEXT

Variants

1. This introductory sentence in not found in the Snar-thang edn. (=N.)
2. N. ལྷଣ୍ଡ
3. N. ལྷୁସ୍ ଫୋର ལྷୁସ୍
4. Peking (=P.) ལྷୁନྷୁଦ୍
5. P. ལྷ
6. P. ལྷୁଣ୍ଡ ଫୋର ལྷୁଣ୍ଡ
7. P. ལྷୁଣ୍ଡ
8. P. ལྷ
9. P. ལྷୁ
10. P. ལྷୁ
11. P. ལྷୁଣ୍ଡ
12. P. ལྷୁଣ୍ଡ
13. N. ལྷୁ
14. P. ལྷୁଣ୍ଡ
15. P. ལྷୁସ୍ (?)

16. P. ଶ୍ରୀଦେବ
17. N. ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ
18. P. ମନୁ
19. P. ଶିବ
20. P. ଶ୍ରୀ
21. P. ମହାଦେବ
22. P. ଶିବ

Verse 95a: Read ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ଭଗବତ for ଶ୍ରୀମନ୍—

“d” Read ମନୁମଦ୍ୟ =ଚିନ୍ତା for ଶ୍ରୀମଦ୍ୟ ବାଲ

TIBETAN-SANSKRIT GLOSSARY

(Figure refers to the verse number)

गुरुः सर्वथा 68.

गुरुः च 68, 101.

गुरुः उपाधि क्षण 81. v. गुरुः

—मालकं अपरक्षण v. गुरुः

गुरुः नः 101.

गुरुः भवताम् 101.

गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः ज्ञानचेतसा 68.

गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः बौद्धेऽपि विज्ञाने 95.

गुरुः विभ्रम 35. v. गुरुः गुरुः

गुरुः यत् 29.

गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः येन स्यात् सहवेदनम् 81d.

गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः यद्यस्ति सहवेदनम् 71.

गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः अविच्छिन्नसजातीयग्रहे 35.

गुरुः गुरुः संमाध्ये 87. v. गुरुः

गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः सिद्धसाधनता भवेत् 87.

गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः नैव……क्वचित् 71.

गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः विरुद्ध 71.

गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः गुरुः भवेत् 87.

अ॒ ज्ञान 71.

अ॒प॒र्ण॒ साधनता 87.

अ॒प॒र्ण॒ भ॒ संसाध्ये 29.

—प॒ साधन 29.

अ॒प॒र्ण॒ व॒ पूर्विका 81. v. दै॒षा॒षा॒

अ॒प॒र्ण॒ व॒ नीलविभ्रमः 35.

—प॒र्ण॒ व॒ दै॒षा॒षा॒ दै॒षा॒षा॒ नाभेदात् नीलतद्वियोः 66.

क॒ श॒षा॒ च॒ वा 95. v. दै॒षा॒षा॒

क॒र्ण॒ व॒ किंवत् 89. v. दै॒षा॒षा॒

क॒र्ण॒ व॒ कि=कस्मात् for किनु 95.

ष॒ष्टिमा॒ एक. v. दै॒षा॒षा॒

—प॒र्ण॒ दै॒षा॒षा॒ नाभेदात् 66.

ष॒ष्टिमा॒ v. दै॒षा॒षा॒

ष॒ष्टिमा॒ v. भ॒ुषा॒; श॒ुषा॒; भ॒षा॒षा॒

क॒षा॒षा॒ v. श॒ुषा॒

क॒षा॒षा॒ यथा 35, यथा हि 101, कथम् 89.

..... दै॒षा॒षा॒ यथा 101.

दै॒षा॒षा॒—क॒र्ण॒ व॒ व॒ व॒ कथं तत् किंवत् इति 89:

ष॒ष्टिमा॒ व॒ व॒ व॒ विवक्षातः 68.

ष॒ष्टिमा॒ व॒ व॒ व॒ लोकेऽस्मिन् 71.

दै॒षा॒षा॒ v. दै॒षा॒षा॒

दै॒षा॒षा॒त्वेन 29. sine skt. v. दै॒षा॒षा॒

ମନ୍ତ୍ରମ୍ ୯୩ 'ମନ୍ତ୍ରମ୍'ମି'ମନ୍ତ୍ରମ୍'ଯଶ'ଶୁଶ୍ରା' ୯୫.

षट्कृष्णसं हेतु 68, 71.

•**ପ୍ରାଣ.** v. **ଜୀବି.** •

ସଂକ୍ଷିପ୍ତ ୧୮୭, ୧୯୫୮

ଶମ୍ଭୁତନ୍ତି ।

શ્રી કે. મ. વિ. એ. મિ. પુ. ન શાસ્કા 89.

୫୯ pro. instrumental v. ଅର୍ଦ୍ଧାର୍ଦ୍ଧା

5. " " " v. 25.

ଦ୍ୱାରା ପାଇଲା । ୮୩-୮୪-ସଂଖ୍ୟା । ଏକକାଲବିଵକ୍ଷାତଃ । ୬୮.

—३३४—
तुल्यकालमतुल्यज्ञं (ज्ञानं) 95.

तन्निर्भास्य वेद्यता 87.

६३६

अतः 44, 66; ततः 71.

ਦੇਵਿ ਦੇਵਿ

ତଦ୍ବୀ v. ଶ୍ଵର୍ଦ୍ଧା

५०८७५

ଅର୍ଥ 101.

୧୯୭୩ ଶତାବ୍ଦୀ ଭାଷା ମାର୍ଗର୍ତ୍ତନ ପ୍ରକାଶକ୍ଷମିତିରେ ୩୫

प्रत्येकपरमाणुनाम् 44.

कृष्ण	pro. genitive, v. कृष्ण
कृष्णवठक्षः	साकार 87. v. वेश्य
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